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SAYING YES: REVIEWING BOARD DECISIONS TO SELL OR 
MERGE THE CORPORATION 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ* 
ABSTRACT 
 This Article responds to the explosion in litigation challenging board decisions to sell or merge 
the corporation by undertaking a comprehensive examination of the standards courts use and 
should use for reviewing such decisions. This examination is unique both in its breath and in its 
return to first principals by framing the analysis around the three goals for judicial review of board 
decisions generally. It shows that current Delaware law on the topic often is a muddle—which 
results from the failure to match standards with these goals. It explores when, in light of these 
goals, review of decisions to sell or merge calls for different standards than are used to review other 
decisions of corporate boards. This, in turn, leads to a proposal narrowing and refining the circum-
stances in which courts should review decisions to sell or merge under different standards than 
applied to other board decisions, as well as guidelines as to what such standards should entail. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The archetype corporate litigation of the 1980s challenged takeover 
defenses used by a corporate board seeking to fend off a hostile tender 
offer (situations in which the board says “no” to a buyer).1 Today, the ar-
chetype corporate litigation challenges the decision by a corporate board 
to sell or merge the company (situations in which the board says “yes” to a 
buyer). Presently, most sales or mergers of public companies for over $100 
million spawn multiple lawsuits complaining that the directors breached 
their fiduciary duties.2 
 To some extent, the explosion in litigation over saying yes is an out-
growth of the explosion in litigation over saying no. Saying yes to one 
buyer says no to other prospective buyers. This sort of Janus-like quality 
not only has fomented increasing litigation over board decisions to sell or 
merge the company, but also has produced a complex and confusing doc-
trinal response by the courts. 
 Traditionally, courts had started from the premise that the board’s 
decision to sell or merge the company was not essentially different from 
any other decision by the board. Thus, it is subject to the business judg-
ment rule under which courts will defer to the directors, barring some 
                                                                                                                                        
 1. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do about 
It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2001) (discussing the causes and judicial responses to the wave of 
litigation over defenses against hostile tender offers). 
 2. E.g., Matthew D. Cain, et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, VAND. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922121 [https://perma.cc/NY5Z-Y8HN].  
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conflicting relationship of directors with the buyer or an egregious lack of 
care.3 By contrast, courts have recognized that actions by boards to fend 
off hostile tender offers involve something of a conflict of interest insofar 
as directors may be motivated by the desire to preserve their positions. 
Hence, such actions are subject to greater judicial scrutiny—the Unocal 
doctrine in Delaware—under which courts evaluate the reasonableness of 
the board’s action.4 However, since selling to one buyer may have the 
purpose or effect of fending off hostile tender offers from other prospective 
buyers, the way is open to argue that greater scrutiny than the business 
judgment rule is the appropriate standard for reviewing a challenged de-
cision to sell or merge the company. 
 Complicating the situation further, corporate statutes do not give the 
board sole authority when it comes to saying yes. Mergers or sales of sub-
stantially all assets normally require a vote of approval by the sharehold-
ers.5 Yet, it is possible to structure some sales or mergers in a way to cir-
cumvent these statutory requirements for shareholder approval.6 More 
commonly, agreements respond to the requirement of shareholder ap-
proval by putting in so-called deal protection devices—termination fees, 
asset and stock lock-ups, and limitations on the board’s action in the in-
terval between agreement and shareholder vote.7 By penalizing negative 
votes of the shareholders, some deal protection devices can pressure 
shareholders into approving a board-favored sale or merger. Depriving 
shareholders of effective consent either by structuring the deal to avoid a 
vote or by pressuring a favorable vote through deal protection devices, in 
turn, raises a further basis for arguing against the application of the 
business judgment rule. 
 Beyond this, there are subtler forces at work. The business judgment 
rule might be understood as a doctrine aimed not at the conduct of direc-
tors but at the conduct of judges—restraining the normal human impulse 
to second-guess the decisions of others.8 The temptation for courts to sec-
ond-guess business decisions can grow, however, with the perceived im-
portance of the decision and the degree to which judges feel confident in 
their ability to evaluate the matter. This means that the magnitude and 
nature of decisions to sell or merge the corporation and the frequency of 
litigation challenging such decisions can operate in often unacknowledged 
                                                                                                                                        
 3. See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
 4. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 5. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c), 271(a) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 
11.04(b), 12.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). 
 6. See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text. 
 7. See infra notes 174-75, 177, 182-83, 194 and accompanying text. 
 8. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 462 (1993). 
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ways to lead courts away from the self-restraint imposed under the busi-
ness judgment rule. 
 As the state of incorporation for the majority of America’s public com-
panies,9 Delaware has had the most opportunity to address the appropri-
ate standards for reviewing board decisions to sell or merge the corpora-
tion. It is the nature of common law that repeated visits by courts to a 
topic might, in some instances, produce greater clarity through the oppor-
tunity to refine doctrine and fill in interstices, but, in other instances, it 
simply produces inconsistency and confusion. Unfortunately, Delaware’s 
experience in reviewing board decisions to sell or merge the corporation 
has followed the latter trajectory with a proliferation of standards for re-
view triggered at often ill-defined borders and imposing often ill-defined 
obligations or levels of scrutiny; all of which results in an erratic pattern 
of judicial second-guessing of some decisions more than others. 
 The litigation churning in the wake of this doctrinal uncertainty im-
poses an added transaction tax on the sale or merger of corporations, both 
for additional shows of process in deciding upon the sale or merger10 and 
for defending and settling the lawsuits that follow a large percentage of 
major deals.11 It is uncertain whether in aggregate for the totality of all 
sales and mergers, the better result obtained for the selling shareholders 
exceeds the cost from this added process and litigation.12 It is worth keep-
ing in mind, however, that better deals for sellers means worse deals for 
buyers—a group already subject to the winner’s curse in auctions13 and 
who, studies suggest, often do not do well as a result of acquisitions.14 Yet, 
                                                                                                                                        
 9. E.g., Liz Hoffman, Dole and Other Companies Sour on Delaware as Corporate Ha-
ven, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2015, 10:38 PM) (reporting that fifty-four percent of public compa-
nies are incorporated in Delaware). 
 10. E.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 69 (3d ed. 2012) 
(concluding that fear of litigation probably has resulted in many board decisions  
being over-processed). 
 11. E.g., Lyman Johnson, The Reconfiguring of Revlon, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 263, 278 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016) 
(Attorney’s fees in settlements of cases challenging mergers “essentially represent a kind of 
transactional ‘excise’ tax . . . .”). 
 12. Compare id. at 14-17 (courts rarely impose liability for damages or enjoin arms-
length mergers), and Jill E. Fisch, et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger 
Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015) 
(study of settlements of suits challenging mergers shows little of value achieved for the selling 
corporations’ shareholders), with C.N.V. Krishnan, et al., Shareholder Litigation in Mergers 
and Acquisitions, 18 J. CORP. FIN. 1248, 1248 (2012) (“[T]he expected rise in takeover premia 
[from litigation challenging mergers] more than offsets the fall in the probability of deal  
completion . . . .”). 
 13. The winner’s curse in auctions refers to the fact that the successful bidder has paid 
an amount greater than any other bidder thought the item was worth, and hence, unless the 
successful bidder has some unique utility from the item or has knowledge that no other bid-
der has, the successful bidder has probably overpaid. 
 14. E.g., Julian Franks, et al., The Postmerger Share-Price Performance of Acquiring 
Firms, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 81 (1991). 
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ironically, it is decisions to sell and, as we shall see, erosion of the busi-
ness judgment rule that have provoked litigation, while board decisions to 
buy have provoked fewer challenges and little evident departure from 
maximum deference under the rule.15 
 Confronting this uncertainty, scholarship addressing judicial review of 
board decisions to sell or merge the corporation has largely taken frag-
mented approaches. Some works look at the heightened scrutiny imposed 
by Delaware courts on decisions to sell or merge in the cases reached by 
the unfathomable Revlon doctrine;16 other works examine lock-ups and 
other deal protection devices;17 and yet other works look at various proce-
dural issues involving class actions challenging board decisions to sell or 
merge.18 The result is a description of parts of the elephant that does not 
make sense of the whole beast. 
 This Article moves toward filling the gap by undertaking a compre-
hensive examination of the standards courts use and should use for re-
viewing board decisions to sell or merge the corporation.19 Part II of this 
Article establishes the framework by briefly outlining the goals for judi-
cial review of board decisions generally. This allows Part III to both de-
scribe the often-befuddled state of the current law (focusing particularly 
on Delaware) and compare how the current standards match up against 
the goals for judicial review. Part IV then steps back to take a wide-angle 
view of standards compared with goals when it comes to judicial review of 
                                                                                                                                        
 15. E.g., Ash v. McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341 (Del. Ch. 2000) (dismissing 
claims against directors who approved what turned out to be a disastrous acquisition). 
 16. For recent articles on Revlon, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-
Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277 (2013); Johnson, supra note 11; Hon. J. Travis Laster, 
Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 5 (2013); Mohsen Manesh, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing Its Age, 71 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. ONLINE 107 (2014). For my own piece focusing on Revlon, see Franklin A. Gevurtz, Re-
moving Revlon, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2013). 
 17. For a recent collection of articles addressing deal protections see the Journal of Cor-
porate Law’s Symposium, Ten Years After Omnicare. E.g., E. Norman Veasey, Ten Years 
After Omnicare: The Evolving Market for Deal Protection Devices, 38 J. CORP. L. 891 (2013). 
 18. For recent articles looking at procedural aspects of class actions challenging mer-
gers, see Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of 
State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015); Fisch, et al., supra note 
12; Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of Chancery’s 
Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669 
(2013); David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An Empirical As-
sessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional Class and Derivative Actions, 38 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 907 (2014). 
 19. In addition, or as an alternative, to charging that the directors breached their fiduci-
ary duty in agreeing to the transaction, lawsuits challenging corporate sales and mergers also 
commonly allege incomplete or misleading disclosure to the shareholders, e.g., Fisch, et al., 
supra note 12, at 564, or might pursue (or even be limited to pursuing) a statutory claim to be 
cashed out at fair value as set by a judicially supervised appraisal. E.g., Glassman v. Unocal 
Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001). Discussion of disclosure claims and appraisal 
rights is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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decisions to sell or merge. To keep this Article to a manageable length, 
this view will not be so wide as to reconsider the approach of corporate 
law to judicial review of board decisions generally. I have said what I have 
to say about that topic elsewhere.20 Instead, Part IV will operate from the 
premise that standards for reviewing board decisions should not vary 
from decision to decision unless there is some reason for such variance 
stemming from the goals for judicial review. Following this premise, Part 
IV will examine both the articulated and unarticulated reasons why 
courts might subject decisions to sell or merge the corporation to different 
standards of review from other board decisions and compare these rea-
sons against the goals of judicial review. This will allow us to narrow and 
refine the circumstances in which courts should apply different standards 
to decisions to sell or merge. It will also provide more precise insight into 
what such standards should entail. 
II.   WHY 
 Discussing standards for reviewing board decisions to sell or merge the 
corporation should start at the beginning by asking what courts seek to 
achieve in reviewing any decision of a corporate board. Indeed, as we shall 
see, much of the problem with the approach of the Delaware courts when 
reviewing board decisions to sell or merge the corporation results from the 
failure to match standards to goals. 
 Unfortunately, some of the normative literature in this area also tends 
to lose track of the goals for judicial review. Specifically, many normative 
discussions speak in terms of bottom line goals—maximizing the amount 
shareholders profit by a merger or sale,21 or, even grander, ensuring that 
sales and mergers move resources to their highest value user22 or serve as 
a discipline on inefficient management.23 This mindset, in turn, leads 
writers into debates over the merits of board decisions regarding sales 
and mergers, such as agreeing to lock-ups or other deal protections.24 Like 
                                                                                                                                        
 20. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Mis-
guided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287 (1994). 
 21. E.g., Sean J. Griffith, The Costs and Benefits of Precommitment: An Appraisal of 
Omnicare v. NCS Healthcare, 29 J. CORP. L. 569, 622 (2004); Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof: 
Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. CORP. L. 865, 884 (2007). 
 22. E.g., John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: 
Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307, 377 (2000). 
 23. E.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539, 1553-54 (1996). 
 24. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-Ups: Do Target Treasury Sales Fore-
close or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682 (1990) (arguing that most 
lock-ups are harmless and should be allowed, but extreme lock-ups under which a bidder 
profits more by losing than by winning the auction forecloses higher value bidders and 
therefore should not be allowed); Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 389-90 (con-
cluding that whether lock-ups are helpful rather than harmful, and therefore should be 
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it or not, however,25 corporate law proceeds from a much greater sense of 
humility when it comes to judicial review for breach of fiduciary duty, 
with the business judgment rule serving as a sort of Hippocratic Oath 
cautioning judges to ‘first, do no harm.’26 Perhaps this is because judges 
(or even academics) who would tell boards what to do might worry about 
hearing the old challenge: ‘If you are so smart, why aren’t you rich?’27 
 Focusing our attention then on judicial review, we can identify 
three basic goals—protecting against disloyal decisions, reducing un-
intended harm, and policing the allocation of power between boards 
and shareholders. 
A.   Protecting Against Disloyal Decisions 
 The most elementary danger of delegating power to act for another’s 
benefit is that persons with such power will use it to benefit themselves 
(or persons controlling them) at the expense of the parties for whom they 
are supposed to act.28 Hence, the first and most fundamental goal of re-
                                                                                                                                        
allowed, depends up a variety of factors); Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-
up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L. 681 (2013) (arguing for careful review of lock-ups, since attorneys 
pursuing their own interests, rather than market forces, are the source of increasingly 
aggressive use of lock-ups); Stephen Fraidin & Jon D. Hanson, Toward Unlocking Lockups, 
103 YALE. L.J. 1739 (1994) (arguing that lock-ups can be helpful and are not harmful and 
therefore should be always allowed); Griffith, supra note 21 (arguing that strong deal pro-
tections are helpful and should be allowed when directors have conducted a good faith 
market check); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 23 (arguing that lock-ups to second bidders 
that are granted in anticipation of a hostile bid interfere with the discipline on poor man-
agement imposed by the market for corporate control and therefore those that exceed a 
reasonable estimate of the bidder’s costs should not be allowed); Quinn, supra note 21 (ar-
guing that termination fees covering the bidder’s costs are helpful and should be allowed, 
but bulletproof deal protections that block other bids will prevent getting the best deal for 
the selling shareholders and should not be allowed); Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subrama-
nian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013 (arguing that courts should 
use game theory to identify effects of deal protections); David A. Skeel, Jr., A Reliance 
Damages Approach to Corporate Lockups, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 564 (1996) (arguing that lock-
ups should be allowed only to the extent that they provide the bidder with the equivalent of 
reliance damages in the event the merger does not occur).  
 25. My prior writing shows I am less of a fan than most. 
 26. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 27. See, e.g., In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) 
(“[B]usinessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills, information and 
judgment not possessed by reviewing courts . . . .”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 
684 (Mich. 1919) (“The judges are not business experts.”); William T. Allen et al., Function 
over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. 
LAW. 1287, 1294 (2001) (“[J]udges also face the difficulty of bringing legal expertise to bear in 
reviewing the decisions of business professionals, an exercise inherently fraught with risks of 
error.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 28. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 127, 129 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“The duty of loyalty addresses 
the risk of abuse of entrusted power to which entrustors are exposed.”); Deborah A. DeMott, 
Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1053-55 (2007) (describing a typography of disloyalty 
by agents). 
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viewing challenged board decisions is to ensure that the directors have 
not sacrificed the interests of the corporation and its shareholders in order 
to benefit themselves29 (or persons controlling the directors30). 
B.   Reducing Unintended Harm 
 The law often seeks to reduce the incidence of harm to persons hurt by 
the poor decisions of others, even when the others intended no harm. 
Laws directed toward this end might operate through ex ante regulation31 
or ex post judicial review, which might order payment of damages both to 
deter harmful decisions and to compensate those harmed.32 While such 
harm commonly consists of physical injury, the law often also seeks to 
prevent financial harm.33 
 The degree to which reducing unintended harm should be a goal for 
judicial review of board decisions is a contentious question. Indeed, many 
argue it should not be a goal at all.34 Others suggest that review of the 
process used by directors to make their decision, but not the substance of 
the decision, can improve outcomes without undue interference by 
courts.35 Still, others assert that allowing some review of the rationality, if 
not the reasonableness, of the substance of a board’s decision reduces un-
intended harm in the same manner that reviewing reasonableness pre-
sumably reduces unintended harms by everyone else in society.36 
                                                                                                                                        
 29. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“A public policy, existing 
through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and 
motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director . . . an undivid-
ed and unselfish loyalty to the corporation . . . .”). 
 30. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (2006) (discussing 
danger of controlling shareholders taking more than their proportionate share of the wealth 
generated by the corporation). 
 31. E.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 563 
(1985) (“There has been a proliferation in collective intervention through safety agencies like 
CPSC, EPA, FAA, FDA, NHTSA, OSHA, and so on, through the alphabet. Perhaps even more 
pervasive are state, local and professional control regimes as diverse as building codes, high-
way engineering departments, and medical quality review boards.” (footnote omitted)). 
 32. Id. at 559. 
 33. See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial 
Crisis: Reflections on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 PAC. 
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 113, 120-130 (2010) (discussing laws seeking to prevent 
excessive risk taking by banks). 
 34. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Cor-
porate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 937 (1983) (advocating abolition of duty of 
care liability). 
 35. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (review of board decisions should focus only on process and good faith). 
 36. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 
4.01(c) (allowing liability despite the business judgment rule if the decision is not just unrea-
sonable but is also irrational). 
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 The business judgment rule encapsulates the outcome of this debate. 
To begin with, a divergence of interpretations of the business judgment 
rule37 reflects the unresolved divergence of viewpoints as to the degree to 
which judicial review should seek to reduce unintended harms from board 
decisions. However, the essence of pretty much every current interpreta-
tion of the rule is to accord directors with greater protection against judi-
cial second-guessing than virtually any other private actor in our socie-
ty.38 This reflects the preponderance of opinion in this debate downplay-
ing the goal of reducing unintended harms from decisions of corporate 
directors. Nevertheless, the fact that the rule still allows judicial interven-
tion in cases of extreme deviations reflects the corresponding weight of 
opinion that corporate law does not completely forsake reducing unin-
tended harms as a goal for judicial review. 
 One other aspect encompassed within the goal of reducing unintended 
harm to others is what to do in situations in which a decision trades off 
harm or benefit to one, versus benefit or harm to another, neither of 
whom (or else we are back to disloyalty) is the decision-maker. In the cor-
porate context, this involves board decisions trading off benefits or harms 
to the shareholders, versus harms or benefits to creditors, employees, and 
other so-called stakeholders in the corporate enterprise. While this topic 
has been of endless fascination to commentators,39 like the rest of the goal 
                                                                                                                                        
 37. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 20, at 289-303 (discussing the various interpretations of 
the business judgment rule, ranging from precluding liability for disinterested decisions so 
long as directors act in good faith, through precluding liability in the absence of gross negli-
gence, and from placing more emphasis on process rather than merits in reviewing disinter-
ested decisions, to occasional older cases stating that the rule simply means directors are not 
liable for their disinterested decisions absent negligence). 
 38. E.g., id.; Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (“While it is often stated that 
corporate directors and officers will be liable for negligence in carrying out their corporate 
duties, all seem agreed that such a statement is misleading . . . . Whereas an automobile 
driver who makes a mistake in judgment as to speed or distance injuring a pedestrian will 
likely be called upon to respond in damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in 
judgment as to economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, 
if ever, be found liable for damages suffered by the corporation.” (citation omitted)). 
 39. E.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. 
L. REV. 1365 (1932); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Cor-
porate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Martin Gelter, Taming or Protecting the Modern 
Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 
641 (2011); Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 1 (2008); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corpo-
rate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441-42 (2001); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stake-
holder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q. 235 (2002); Jona-
than R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the 
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991); David 
Millon, New Game Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of 
Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001 (2000); Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsi-
bility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002); Milton Fried-
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of reducing unintended harms, the business judgment rule has limited 
the practical impact of judicial review in setting corporate law limits on 
such tradeoffs to extreme cases.40 
C.   Policing the Allocation of Power Between Board and Shareholders 
 The two goals above correspond to the oft-listed duties of loyalty and 
care imposed on corporate directors.41 At a much earlier time, courts and 
writers would have paid equal attention to a third goal—that of ensuring 
directors stayed within limits imposed on their power.42 With the decline 
of the ultra vires doctrine,43 the power concern now occupies only a small 
role in reviewing general business decisions by directors. Nevertheless, in 
certain contexts in which corporate law divides power between board and 
shareholders, someone must referee power disputes between the two.44 
Accordingly, a third goal for judicial review of board decisions is to resolve 
such disputes with fidelity to the division of power sought by the govern-
ing statute or documents.45 
                                                                                                                                        
man, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 
1970, at 17. 
 40. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 
92 (Del. 2007) (directors have a duty to creditors only when the corporation is insolvent); 
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Getting Real About Corporate Social Responsibility: A Reply to Profes-
sor Greenfield, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645, 648-50 (2002) (finding that courts generally have 
not scrutinized business decisions to see whether directors sacrificed profit maximization to 
advance the interests of employees, creditors, customers, and the community). 
 41. E.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 278 (2d ed. 2010). 
 42. See, e.g., 1 WM. L. Clark & WM. L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS § 204 (1901) (discussing ultra vires doctrine). 
 43. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 41, at 20, § 1.1.3b (describing the gradual decline of the 
ultra vires doctrine in the nineteenth century as a result of legislative and judicial actions, 
which expanded the permissible activities directors could have the corporation undertake). 
 44. E.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008) (addressing 
the ability of the shareholders to command actions by the board through placing such com-
mands into the corporation’s bylaws using the shareholders’ statutory power to amend the 
bylaws); Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del. 2003) (“[T]he Dela-
ware corporation law expressly provides for a balance of power between boards and stock-
holders which makes merger transactions a shared enterprise and ownership decision.”); 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (holding that the directors 
have the power under their general statutory power to manage the corporation and the more 
specific power to have the corporation repurchase its outstanding stock to have the corpora-
tion make a self-tender offer for the purpose of interfering with the shareholders’ selling their 
stock to a party making a hostile tender offer); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 
437 (Del. 1971) (addressing the ability of the board to amend the bylaws in order to change 
the annual meeting date in a manner that negatively impacted the ability of dissident share-
holders to wage a proxy contest). 
 45. This is not to say what constitutes fidelity in the spectrum between strict adher-
ence to text versus interpretation based upon the purposes behind the governing provisions 
when seeking to determine the division of power sought by statute or governing documents. 
Hence, the approach of the Delaware courts to refereeing power disputes between board 
and shareholders is often to adopt a broad reading of power granted to the board but then 
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III.   THE PRESENT MUDDLE 
 Courts, particularly in Delaware, apply various standards of review to 
decisions by directors to sell or merge corporations. While several of these 
standards are not, at least on their face, any different than the standards 
courts apply when reviewing decisions by directors in general, a pair of 
other standards, which arose out of cases dealing with takeover contests, 
are quite different. Many times, the application of these standards seems 
to readily correspond with the goals for judicial review of board decisions; 
in many other instances, however, figuring out the correspondence is 
head scratching. 
A.   Starting Normal: Protecting Against Disloyalty When Sales or 
Mergers Involve Conventional Conflicts of Interest 
 The principal exception to the application of the business judgment 
rule traditionally occurs when the board’s decision involves a conflict of 
interest for some or all board members or parties controlling board mem-
bers.46 Here, it is easy to see that the goal for judicial review is to protect 
against disloyal decisions. 
 The simplest conflict of interest in selling the corporation occurs if di-
rectors or officers are among those purchasing, or owning the entity pur-
chasing, the corporation—what is commonly referred to as a management 
buyout or MBO.47 A subtler conflict of interest problem exists when direc-
tors or officers make a contract with the buyer for themselves (for exam-
ple, to continue to work for the business after the sale) at the same time 
that they are negotiating to sell or merge the corporation. Because of the 
concern that directors or officers will trade a lower price for the overall 
company in exchange for a better contract for themselves, the parallel 
negotiation of such side deals and the sale or merger subjects the sale or 
merger to the more intense judicial review reserved for conflict of interest 
transactions generally.48 
 Mergers in which the majority or controlling shareholder ends up with 
the entire ownership of the corporation (freeze-outs of minority share-
holders), force the directors to deal with the person who elected them and 
has the power to remove them. Hence, courts treat such transactions as 
presenting a conflict of interest.49 Even when all shareholders are selling, 
rather than the majority kicking out the minority, different motivations 
                                                                                                                                        
to refine that by examining the equity of the use of power in a particular case. E.g., 
Schnell, 285 A.2d at 439. 
 46. E.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971). 
 47. E.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). 
 48. E.g., Smith v. Good Music Station, Inc., 129 A.2d 242 (Del. Ch. 1957). 
 49. E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983). 
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by controlling shareholders might create a conflict of interest.50 A factual 
issue that can arise in cases involving shareholder conflicts is whether 
shareholders with a large, but not a majority, block of votes are neverthe-
less controlling shareholders.51 
 Conflicts of interest by persons other than directors, officers, or share-
holders can also impact decisions to sell or merge the corporation. For in-
stance, conflicts of interest arise when investment bankers provide advice 
and assistance to the board of the seller in seeking the best deal, while at 
the same time the investment banker is attempting to sell services (com-
monly, assistance in raising money to finance the purchase) to a prospec-
tive buyer. Under such circumstances, the investment banker may steer 
the deal toward a buyer who will use its services over a buyer who will 
not (but who might pay a higher price for the corporation). A particularly 
egregious case of this sort recently led to a significant dollar award 
against the investment banker in RBC Capital Markets, LLC v. Jervis52 
based upon the theory that the investment banker aided and abetted the 
board’s breach of duty.53 
 Corporate law in the United States, as typified by Delaware, generally 
takes a tri-part approach to dealing with conflict of interest transactions. 
Essentially, courts will void a transaction presenting a conflict of interest 
for directors or officers unless disinterested directors or shareholders ap-
proved the transaction after full disclosure, or the court, after careful 
scrutiny, finds the transaction is fair.54 Delaware courts talk of fairness 
(or intrinsic fairness) as entailing fair dealing—including disclosure of all 
facts material to the transaction, but also looking at factors such as the 
                                                                                                                                        
 50. E.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013) (venture capital 
firms owning preferred stock had their representatives on the board push to sell the company 
in order to bail their investment out of a “zombie company” in a deal in which common stock-
holders received nothing). 
 51. Compare In re Zhongpin, Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 7393-VCN, 2014 WL 6735457 
(Del. Ch. Nov. 26, 2014) (plaintiff pled sufficient facts to suggest founder and CEO was a con-
trolling shareholder even though he only owned seventeen percent of the stock), with In re 
Crimson Exploration, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 8541-VCP, 2014 WL 5449419 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
24, 2014) (a thirty-four percent shareholder was probably not a controlling shareholder even 
though three of seven directors were its employees). 
 52. 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015). 
 53. Lest one worry too much about the ‘blame the victim’ quality of finding that the 
poorly served directors breached their duty, the court found a breach of duty sufficient to 
attach the aiding and abetting claim based upon a less deferential standard of review than 
applicable to a claim against the directors themselves. 
 54. E.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 41, at § 4.2.1. Application of this approach to dealings 
with majority or controlling shareholders is more complex because of concerns regarding how 
much trust courts should place in any directors or even minority shareholders when dealing 
with a majority or controlling shareholder. See, e.g., Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 
635, 642 (Del. 2014) (returning scrutiny of freeze-out mergers to the business judgment rule if 
negotiated by a committee of independent directors and (not or) approved by a majority of the 
minority shareholder vote). 
2017]  SAYING YES 449 
  
timing of the deal and the extent of negotiation—and fair price.55 Fair 
price, in turn, equates to an arms-length deal and often encompasses a 
range of values.56 While some jurisdictions treat fair dealing (particularly 
disclosure) and fair price as a conjunctive test,57 Delaware courts lump 
them together into a holistic review,58 in which better process provides 
more slack on the substance of the price59 and clear proof of a fair price 
can offset failing in process,60 or, viewed from the other side, weakness in 
process can lead to greater skepticism about the price61 and weakness in 
price can lead to greater doubts about the process.62 
B.   Maybe Normal: Addressing Unintended Harm from Decisions to Sell 
or Merge in the Absence of Conflicts of Interest 
 In the absence of conflicts of interest, courts normally apply the 
business judgment rule when dealing with challenges by disgruntled 
shareholders to decisions by corporate boards.63 Delaware courts have 
equated the standard under the business judgment rule with a find-
ing of gross negligence.64 
 The leading case equating the business judgment rule with a gross 
negligence standard, Smith v. Van Gorkom,65 also happens to be the lead-
ing case applying this standard to a board’s decision to sell or merge the 
corporation. Van Gorkom, shortly before he was due to retire from being 
CEO of Trans Union Corporation, negotiated a deal to sell Trans Union 
for $55 per share in a cash-out merger. The Delaware Supreme Court 
found the directors of Trans Union Corporation grossly negligent for ap-
proving this transaction after only a two-hour meeting, at which the di-
                                                                                                                                        
 55. E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 56. E.g., Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 225 (Del. 1976); In re Orchard Enter., Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 57. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979 (Wash. 
1964). 
 58. E.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. 
 59. Id. at 709 n.7 (suggested that a showing of fairness is strengthened if boards use an 
independent negotiating committee to deal with the majority shareholder). 
 60. See, e.g., In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013) (finding a deal 
in which the common stock received nothing to be fair, despite unfair process, because of 
proof that the common stock had no value). 
 61. E.g., William Penn P’ship v. Saliba, 13 A.3d 749, 757-78 (Del. 2011) (non-disclosure 
negatively impacted the court’s view of the fairness of the price). 
 62. See, e.g., In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Deriv. Litig., 52 A.3d 761, 801-02 (Del. 
Ch. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012) (poor 
price led the court to believe that the independent committee was just rationalizing the deal 
rather than seriously considering options). 
 63. E.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). 
 64. E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 65. 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
450  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:437 
  
 
rectors (who were just learning of the proposed deal) relied upon a twen-
ty-minute oral presentation by Van Gorkom and did not inquire into the 
basis for the price. Next time, order sandwiches and plan to spend the day 
in a meeting. 
 Following cries of angst after Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature 
added Section 102(b)(7)66 to Delaware’s corporation statute. This section 
allows companies to place in their certificate of incorporation a provision 
waiving liability of directors for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary 
duty. The section, however, does not allow waivers for certain misconduct, 
notably including acts not in good faith. The Delaware Supreme Court 
characterized the good faith standard applicable when selling a corpora-
tion with a Section 102(b)(7) waiver as “whether th[e] directors utterly 
failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price.”67 
 So far, this all seems consistent with the minimalist approach of corpo-
rate law to reducing unintended harm from board decisions. In a law re-
view article,68 however, three prominent Delaware jurists (Allen, Jacobs, 
and Strine) commented that the Delaware Supreme Court had, in their 
view, slipped the bounds of the business judgment rule in reviewing board 
decisions to sell the corporation, even when, in Van Gorkom and in the 
court’s later decision in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Cede II),69 the Su-
preme Court purported to be applying the rule. Van Gorkom is a notori-
ously controversial decision.70 Cede II undercut the notion that Van 
Gorkom was a one-off, with Cede II’s holding that the directors had been 
grossly negligent in approving the sale of the corporation despite, unlike 
the board of Trans Union, having a favorable fairness opinion on the deal 
from an investment banker. 
 Of course, one should be wary of making too much out of the fact that 
many might disagree with the result in a given case or two, especially 
when applying inherently imprecise standards such as gross negligence. 
The significance exists if the decision is symptomatic of an overall tenden-
cy—in this instance, to more carefully scrutinize decisions to sell or merge 
a corporation. In fact, seen in the light of later doctrinal developments, 
Van Gorkom and Cede II might now be understood as forays in moving 
toward explicitly more rigorous judicial scrutiny of board decisions to sell 
or merge the corporation. We now turn to those developments. 
                                                                                                                                        
 66. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2015). 
 67.  Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 244 (Del. 2009). This assumes the plain-
tiff attempts to show a lack of good faith from a lack of effort as opposed to bad motives. Chen 
v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 68. Allen et al., supra note 27. 
 69. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). 
 70. E.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 
BUS. LAW. 1437 (1985). 
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C.   Becoming Unrecognizable: Detaching the Standard from the Goals of 
Judicial Review in the Revlon Doctrine 
 Thus far, we have examined cases in which courts treat decisions to 
sell or merge the corporation at least nominally the same as any other 
decision of the board. But, most litigation involving arms-length sales and 
mergers come within what is known as the Revlon doctrine.71 This doc-
trine arose in the context of selling to a “white knight” in a takeover con-
test, when the relationship between selling to one buyer (saying yes) and 
rejecting another buyer (saying no) is most transparent. The doctrine, 
however, is not limited to that context, making it difficult to figure out the 
basis for the Revlon doctrine and specifically, which of the goals for judi-
cial review it seeks to achieve. 
1.   Making Up a Rule in Revlon 
 Revlon72 arose out of an effort by a company named Pantry Pride to 
acquire Revlon using borrowed money, the debt from which Pantry Pride 
intended to repay by selling off Revlon’s divisions. Unable to deter Pantry 
Pride from making a hostile tender offer, Revlon’s board authorized its 
management to seek other buyers. Management’s efforts produced a bid 
from the private equity firm, Forstmann Little, which also involved pay-
ing cash for all outstanding Revlon stock, financed by debt to be repaid 
through the sale of Revlon’s divisions. Revlon’s board accepted Forst-
mann’s offer and cut off further bidding by granting Forstmann a lock-up 
option to buy a pair of Revlon’s divisions so cheaply that it became uneco-
nomic for Pantry Pride to buy Revlon. This decision to block further bids 
came in the face of the stated intention by Pantry Pride to top, by at least 
a small margin, any competing bid. 
 In the lawsuit brought by Pantry Pride, the Delaware Supreme Court 
condemned the action of Revlon’s board to cut off bidding. Given that eve-
ryone recognized Revlon’s breakup was inevitable and the board had au-
thorized efforts to sell the company, the court explained in a much-quoted 
passage: “The directors’ role changed from defenders of the corporate bas-
tion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders 
at a sale of the company.”73 Finding that Revlon’s directors had not acted 
to get the best price, the court enjoined the deal with Forstmann.74  
 The subsequent history of Revlon suggests that sometimes courts 
should quit while they are ahead. Even under the business judgment rule, 
directors would seem to have some explaining to do if, in choosing be-
                                                                                                                                        
 71. E.g., Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 24, at 702. 
 72. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 73. Id. at 182. 
 74. Id. at 185. 
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tween two bidders offering cash for all the shares, they did not pick the 
one that would pay the highest price. Beyond this, however, it has been 
difficult to sensibly decide in what other cases Revlon has something rele-
vant to say and to figure out what this something is. Perhaps this is be-
cause no one has ever articulated any persuasive rationale for the Revlon 
doctrine measured against the goals for judicial review of board decisions. 
2.   When Do Courts Apply Revlon? 
 When a standard of scrutiny arises from the goals for judicial review, 
events triggering such scrutiny follow from the goals; so, conflicts of inter-
est trigger the fairness test to protect against disloyalty. The flip side is 
that controversy over the boundaries for triggering a standard of scrutiny 
might be a symptom demonstrating that the standard lacks a basis in the 
goals for judicial review. This describes the Revlon doctrine. 
(a)   The Foundational Formulations and the Paradox of Paramount’s 
Paramours 
 From Revlon, one cannot really tell whether its rule is limited to 
defensive sales and auctions that, in either event, lead to the breakup 
of the company, or encompasses any decision by the board to sell the 
company. The Delaware Supreme Court landed on a middle ground 
between these two extremes through a pair of cases involving efforts 
by the movie company, Paramount, to merge with companies operat-
ing cable television networks. 
 In the first case, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,75 
Paramount tried to supplant a planned merger between Time (who not 
only published magazines, but also operated the HBO network) and an-
other movie company, Warner, by beaming in with a generous tender of-
fer to the Time shareholders before they could vote on the merger with 
Warner.76 This, in turn, caused Time’s board to restructure the transac-
tion with Warner to pay the Warner shareholders with cash and debt ra-
ther than Time stock, thereby removing the need for a vote by Time’s 
shareholders and forcing through the Warner merger.77 
 In the resulting lawsuit by Paramount and disappointed Time share-
holders, the plaintiffs argued that the decision of Time’s board to merge 
with Warner—whose pre-merger shareholders under the original plan 
would end up with a larger stake in the combined Time-Warner entity 
                                                                                                                                        
 75. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 76. See id. at 1147. 
 77. See id. 
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than would the pre-merger Time shareholders78—put Time up for sale 
and thereby triggered Revlon. Both the Delaware Chancery and Supreme 
Court rejected this argument; the Delaware Supreme Court doing so in 
an opinion that seemed to adopt the narrow interpretation of Revlon’s 
scope as limited to sales leading to dissolutions or breakups and occurring 
either after an auction or in response to a hostile tender offer.79 
 This view of Revlon’s scope did not last a second case involving Para-
mount. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.,80 it 
was Paramount’s board that had entered into a merger agreement with a 
cable network company (Viacom Inc., who operated Showtime) and then 
received a higher bid from another cable network company (QVC, who 
operated the home shopping network).81 Blocked by aggressive deal pro-
tection provisions in the Paramount-Viacom merger agreement—
including a lock-up option for Viacom to buy almost twenty percent of 
Paramount’s stock cheaply—QVC sued.82 
 Once again, Paramount lost when, much to Paramount’s surprise, the 
Delaware Supreme Court decided to apply Revlon.83 As its rationale, the 
Supreme Court focused on the fact that the deal Paramount’s board made 
with Viacom would leave Viacom’s controlling shareholder (Sumner Red-
stone) in control of the combined entity.84 By contrast, the court explained, 
the transaction in Time had left control in whatever fluid aggregation of 
unaffiliated shareholders might come together to cast a majority vote in 
any given election.85 The Delaware Supreme Court thereby took a middle 
ground regarding the situations triggering Revlon. This adds to auctions 
and defensive sales leading to the breakup of the company, so-called sales 
of control in which the transaction leaves one person with controlling 
ownership of the corporation. 
                                                                                                                                        
 78. Id. at 1149. Under the original Time-Warner merger agreement, the former Warner 
shareholders would have ended up owning sixty-two percent of the combined company. Id.  
 79. Id. at 1150-51, 1151 n.14. 
 80. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id. at 39-40. 
 83. Id. at 46-48. 
 84. Redstone owned an overwhelming majority of the voting stock in Viacom, and the 
shareholders of Paramount would only receive a limited amount of voting (as opposed to non-
voting) stock in Viacom. Id. at 38.  
 85. Id. at 46-48. This was the rationale that the Chancery Court had used to reject the 
application of Revlon in Time. See Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150. Notice that under this view 
it did not matter that the originally planned Time-Warner merger called for the former 
Warner shareholders to receive a majority of the voting stock in Time, since the court con-
ceived of the former Warner shareholders as indistinguishable from the original Time share-
holders—in both cases, the shareholders were simply numerous unaffiliated investors in a 
fluid market. Id. at 43, 46-47.  
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 This middle ground approach, as illustrated by the outcomes in Time 
and QVC, creates something of a paradox. In QVC, the shift in control 
over Paramount to a stranger under the proposed Paramount-Viacom 
merger,86 triggered what all assumed was the more intensive scrutiny 
under Revlon. By contrast, in Time, the court applied what all assumed to 
be less scrutiny under Unocal to the board’s forcing through Time’s mar-
riage to Warner—even though this merger left Time’s board and man-
agement in charge of the combined entity. As a result, the rule is that the 
greater the conflict of interest for the selling corporation’s board (as far as 
retaining the current directors’ and managers’ power), the less the court’s 
scrutiny of the board’s action—which seems to show that Revlon is not 
about the goal of protecting against disloyalty. 
(b)   Continuing Controversies over Revlon’s Coverage 
 Revlon referred both to the inevitability of breaking up the corporation 
and to the board’s decision to seek a sale as changing the role of the board 
into auctioneers.87 Later cases establish that the key moment is the deci-
sion to seek a sale. So, in Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan,88 the Del-
aware Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the directors 
should have investigated possible acquirers as soon as the interest of a 
determined buyer put the company “in play” and thereby rendered the 
sale inevitable, but the board had not yet decided to seek a sale.89 Flipping 
the situation around, the Delaware Supreme Court recently held in RBC 
that once the board decides to seek a sale, it could not avoid application of 
Revlon to its conduct prior to agreeing to the actual transaction on the 
ground that the sale is not inevitable until the board actually agrees to a 
specific deal.90 This, however, does not necessarily mean that the board 
cannot change its mind once it decides to seek a sale. In Arnold v. Society 
for Savings Bancorp, Inc.,91 the Delaware Supreme Court held that a 
stock-for-stock merger, which left control dispersed among numerous un-
affiliated shareholders, did not trigger Revlon even though the directors 
unsuccessfully sought a bust-up transaction prior to agreeing to the stock 
merger.92 In other words, Revlon triggers at the moment the board de-
                                                                                                                                        
 86. While Paramount’s CEO apparently was to be the CEO of the combined Paramount-
Viacom company, the existence of a controlling shareholder of the combined company pre-
sumably would place the CEO into a subordinate role. See id. at 38.  
 87.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 88. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
 89. Id. at 241-43.  
 90. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 853-54, 853 n.121 (Del. 2015). 
 91. 650 A.2d 1270, 1274, 1289-90 (Del. 1994). 
 92. But see Johnson, supra note 11, at 2 (arguing that Revlon can apply to botched ef-
forts to make a sale that would otherwise fall within the doctrine). 
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cides to embark upon a transaction within the doctrine so long as the final 
transaction fits within the doctrine. 
 A more controversial question is whether cashing out the shareholders 
triggers Revlon regardless of whether the buyer has a controlling share-
holder. To the simple-minded,93 the most obvious fact about the situation 
in Revlon was that it involved a choice between two all-cash, all-shares 
bids, making the only rational choice for directors to pick the bidder who 
will pay the shareholders the most cash. Subsequent descriptions of 
Revlon by the Delaware Supreme Court,94 however, focus not on the cash, 
but on the bidders’ plans to breakup the company—evidently based upon 
the notion that the board’s decision to sell to such a bidder rendered irrel-
evant Unocal’s holding that the board can take defensive actions in re-
sponse to “a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness.”95 
 At first glance, QVC reinforces the view that the nature of the consid-
eration received by the selling shareholders is irrelevant, since the court 
applied Revlon to a situation in which the board was faced with two bids, 
each with an equal mix of cash and of stock in the purchasing corporation. 
Nevertheless, QVC introduced an important conceptual shift that sug-
gests the nature of the consideration might matter. Specifically, in hold-
ing that a change in control triggers Revlon, the court in QVC focused not 
on the impact to the corporation, but rather on the impact to the stock-
holders, including their lost ability to obtain a premium from selling con-
trol in the future96—something that is obviously true in a cash sale. 
 Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court opinions are inconclusive. In 
Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court accepted that a cash-out merger 
with a privately held buyer constitutes a change in control triggering 
Revlon.97 By contrast, in In re Santa Fe Pacific Corp. Shareholder Litiga-
tion,98 the Delaware Supreme Court held that Revlon did not apply to a 
merger with a company lacking a controlling shareholder when only 33 
percent of the shareholders of the merging company received cash in the 
transaction while the rest received stock. Falling in between these two 
cases are situations in which, like Lyondell but not Santa Fe, the consid-
eration is predominately cash rather than predominately stock-for-stock, 
but, like Santa Fe but not Lyondell, the transaction is with a company 
lacking a controlling shareholder.  
 Absent decisive direction from the Delaware Supreme Court, the Del-
aware Chancery Court has issued several opinions stating that cash-out 
                                                                                                                                        
 93. Me. 
 94. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time, 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989). 
 95. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 96. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993). 
 97.  Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 242-43 (Del. 2009). 
 98. 669 A.2d 59, 64-65, 71 (Del. 1995). 
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mergers trigger Revlon if cash constitutes a primary proportion of the 
consideration, even if the merger occurs with a company lacking a control-
ling shareholder and so unaffiliated shareholders in the market still ulti-
mately control the combined firms.99 The basic rationale is that “there is 
no long run” for the cashed-out shareholders to justify forgoing maximum 
immediate value in favor of the sort of considerations listed in Unocal100—
which brings one back to the simple minded view of what Revlon was 
about, but does not explain why one needs much of a doctrine. 
3.   What Does Revlon Alter? 
 Given the frequent dispute about when Revlon applies, one would 
have assumed that it is clear what it actually does. This, however, is not 
the case. Instead, Revlon and later opinions applying the doctrine suggest 
three possible impacts: (1) limiting the goals directors can pursue in the 
situation; (2) supplanting general standards governing the directors’ con-
duct and the courts’ review of this conduct with more specific rules for the 
process directors are to follow; and (3) imposing a heightened standard of 
judicial scrutiny over directors’ actions. Unfortunately, the Delaware Su-
preme Court has treated these three impacts like the three shells in the 
carnival game in which a pea always seems magically to appear under a 
different shell than the player guessed. This is another symptom of a 
standard unhinged from the goals for judicial review that would justify 
anything more than the minimal scrutiny of the business judgment rule. 
(a)   Limitation of Permissible Goals 
 One aspect of the Revlon doctrine seems to be a narrowing of permis-
sible goals for directors to pursue once they enter into the tube governed 
by Revlon. This involves both a clear, but controversial identification of an 
impermissible goal and an uncontroversial, but ultimately obscure state-
ment regarding the goal toward which directors must work. 
 The impermissible goal of the directors identified in Revlon is the pro-
tection of the interests of the company’s creditors over the interests of the 
company’s shareholders.101 Here, the court entered into the long debate 
about shareholder primacy versus stakeholder models in one of the rare 
                                                                                                                                        
 99. See, e.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 
WL 2028076, *15 (Del. Ch. May, 2011); In re NYMEX S’holder Litig., Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-
VCN, 2009 WL 3206051, *5 (Del. Ch. Sept., 2009); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 
720, 732 (Del. Ch. Dec., 1999). 
 100. In re Lukens, 757 A.2d at 732 n.25. 
 101. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
The court tosses out a bit of a red herring in its suggestion that the directors were con-
cerned about the noteholders because the noteholders threatened to sue the directors, only 
to point out that the noteholders would not have had a claim against the directors anyway. 
Id. at 182-83. 
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decisions in which it really mattered.102 Confronted with the language in 
its earlier Unocal decision, which stated that directors may take into ac-
count the interests of other corporate constituencies in reacting to a hos-
tile tender offer,103 the court in Revlon explained that this is only true if 
there are rationally related benefits accruing to the shareholders. This, 
the court concluded, meant that concern for non-shareholder interests 
was no longer appropriate once the directors decided to auction rather 
than protect the company. 
 This analysis follows a highly traditional, although often highly 
artificial, reconciliation of stakeholder interests with shareholder 
primacy long found in corporate law decisions in the United States. 
Under this reconciliation, courts defer to directors’ decisions to sacri-
fice immediate profits and instead take actions that promote the wel-
fare of workers, creditors, consumers, or the community on the 
ground that directors might rationally believe such actions could 
profit the corporation and therefore its shareholders over the long 
run.104 Such long run benefit for the shareholders cannot occur, how-
ever, either if the transaction involves the dissolution or breakup of 
the corporation, or if all the shareholders are going to sell their 
shares immediately for cash in any event. In this instance, the only 
way to uphold the board’s decision to sacrifice maximum gain for the 
shareholders in order to look out for other constituencies is to reject 
the traditional reconciliation and take a broader view of the directors’ 
duty. Revlon refused to do so. A number of states have come out dif-
ferently as a result of their legislatures’ adoption of so-called other 
constituencies statutes.105 These statutes empower the board to look 
out for other stakeholders in the corporation without regard to 
whether this advances the interest of the shareholders.106 In any 
event, this is the one portion of the Revlon doctrine at least tethered 
to the goals of judicial review in a manner consistent with the normal 
humility of corporate law—Revlon marked an extreme situation in 
which the court intervened to enforce the traditional boundaries for 
trading off the interests of the shareholders versus other corporate 
stakeholders as part of the goal of reducing unintended harm. 
 Juxtaposed against this statement of an impermissible goal, Revlon 
set out a command identifying the goal toward which the directors must 
                                                                                                                                        
 102. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 103. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 104. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 40. 
 105. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (2018) (“[D]irectors are not required to con-
sider the effects of a proposed corporate action on any particular corporate constituent group 
or interest as a dominant or controlling factor.”). 
 106. For a discussion of these statutes see Am. Bar Ass’n. Comm. on Corp. Laws, Other 
Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253 (1990). 
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work. Specifically, the court stated that once the situation changed from 
defending against a takeover to selling the company, the central theme 
guiding the directors should have been obtaining the highest price for the 
shareholders.107 Like a shimmering mirage on the desert surface, this 
command promises much and delivers frustration. 
 This command made sense in its original context. After all, in a 
situation in which the directors are choosing between two competing, 
all-cash bids with essentially the same method of financing, what 
else is there to do, assuming the directors’ duty runs to the share-
holders and no one else, but get the shareholders the highest price? 
The problem with this limited rationale manifests in QVC, when op-
tions become more complicated. Both bids for Paramount involved a 
roughly equal mix of cash and of stock in the purchasing corporation. 
Here, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the directors must 
pursue the “best value reasonably available to the stockholders.”108 
 Yet, how does this “best value reasonably available to the stock-
holders” objective differ from the continuing obligation that directors 
owe to the shareholders in any decision directors make regarding a 
corporate merger or acquisition, or, indeed, in any context? Put in 
terms of a concrete example, how did the impermissible objective for 
Paramount’s directors in agreeing to the Viacom merger rather than 
going with QVC, differ from the permissible objective for Time’s di-
rectors in agreeing to the Warner merger rather than going with 
Paramount in the Time case, where the court did not apply Revlon? 
The court’s answer is a Rorschach test. 
 For those predisposed to find that Revlon narrows the acceptable goals 
for directors, the court in Time explained that whereas Revlon triggers a 
duty to maximize “immediate shareholder value,” review under Unocal 
was not intended to lead to a simple “mathematical exercise” of compar-
ing the discounted value of Time-Warner shares at some point in the fu-
ture versus the value of Paramount’s offer.109 
 The problem with this sort of formulation shows up when one looks at 
the factors involved in the choices facing the directors in the two cases. In 
QVC, the value of the bids depended in substantial measure upon the fu-
ture performance of the stock in each packet, which, in turn, depended 
both on the performance of the combined entity (Paramount and Viacom 
or Paramount and QVC) and the interest in the combined entity repre-
                                                                                                                                        
 107. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 964. 
 108. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993). 
 109. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150, 1153 (Del. 1989). 
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sented by the stock received by Paramount’s shareholders.110 But, the 
same sort of variables concerning the growth of the pie and the number of 
slices were at the heart of the decision facing the directors in Time. Specif-
ically, the impact of the Time-Warner merger on Time’s pre-merger 
stockholders depended upon whether the increase in the future earnings 
of the combined entity outweighed the immediate impact on Time’s pre-
merger shareholders resulting from issuing Time stock (or, under the re-
vised iteration, cash) to the Warner shareholders.111 Once Paramount ar-
rived on the scene with a competitive bid, there was the additional ques-
tion as to whether the value Time’s shareholders gained in the Warner 
merger exceeded what Paramount offered. How is the determination of 
immediate shareholder value called for in QVC pursuant to Revlon sup-
posed to differ from the more open-ended goals analysis allowed under 
Unocal in Time? Is the court saying that because Revlon did not apply, 
Time’s directors were free to ignore whether the increased earnings from 
the Time-Warner combination would at least eventually offset the cash or 
shares paid to Warner’s pre-merger shareholders or whether Paramount’s 
offer provided better value for Time’s stockholders than the Warner com-
bination no matter how and when measured? 
 Maybe the court is saying that without Revlon, directors are enti-
tled to use their own informed judgment on whether a combination or 
other decision enhances shareholder value, but once Revlon applies, 
directors must look to the market valuations of the exchanged securi-
ties112—which are immediate in the sense that one can cash out at 
this price today.113 Nevertheless, other language in QVC casts doubt 
on this market value interpretation. Specifically, the court in QVC 
explained that directors are entitled under Revlon to take into ac-
count the bidder’s business plans for the corporation and their effects 
on stockholder interest, and directors are not required to ignore total-
ly their view of the future value of a strategic alliance.114 
                                                                                                                                        
 110. See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 853-69 (5th ed. 2015) (discuss-
ing valuation in the context of selling a corporation, including the impact when sellers receive 
shares in the purchasing corporation). 
 111. See, e.g., id. at 869-70 (discussing impact on the purchasing corporation’s sharehold-
ers of issuing shares to purchase another corporation). 
 112. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain 
Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521 (2002) (attempting to explain Revlon as a 
situation in which courts focus on “visible” (market) value as the measure of a transaction’s 
merits, as opposed to allowing directors to act based upon the directors’ potential knowledge 
of “hidden” value of the corporation that the market price does not reflect). 
 113. It is true that business strategies often involve tradeoffs between short-term and 
long-term profits and that different investors might discount future profits differently, but 
this still does not explain immediate shareholder value as anything other than market prices. 
 114. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1993). 
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 Perhaps the answer is not found in what the court says, but what it 
actually did. In finding that Paramount’s directors breached their duty, 
the court pointed to the $1 billion dollar advantage of the QVC bid over 
the Viacom bid when measured by the current market value of the securi-
ties involved and stated that Paramount’s directors could not justify giv-
ing up this much advantage based upon their vision of a future strategy 
over which they would no longer have control.115 So, is the court saying 
that market valuation trumps under Revlon and that a change in control 
precludes consideration of the added value of a strategic combination be-
yond that recognized in market prices, or is the court saying that directors 
must justify disregarding huge disparities in market valuations of com-
peting bids and that a new management’s continued willingness to im-
plement the outgoing board’s strategic plan following a change in control 
is too uncertain a reed upon which to justify such a huge disparity? If the 
answer is the latter, then by what standard does the court decide how 
much disparity in market values is too much for directors to overcome by 
their own assessments? We shall return to this question when we consid-
er whether Revlon imposes a higher level of judicial scrutiny over direc-
tors’ decisions than imposed by Unocal. 
 In the meantime, QVC starts to shift our attention from goals to pro-
cess. Specifically, another way of viewing a command to focus more on 
market values in comparing bids is that the overall goal for directors re-
mains the same—get the best value for the shareholders—but now, the 
court will specify the process directors must use in working toward this 
goal. This brings us to the second possible impact of Revlon. 
(b)   Substitution of Process Rules for General Standards of Conduct 
and Review 
 A fundamental tension in the law lies in choosing between governing 
conduct through specific rules (e.g., a posted speed limit) or through gen-
eral standards (act as a reasonable prudent person).116 When setting forth 
the impact of Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court has tried to have it 
both ways.117 
 This inconsistency manifested itself in a two-round tussle between the 
Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court—first in Lyondell and then, not 
long ago, in C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General Employ-
                                                                                                                                        
 115. Id. at 50. 
 116. E.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557 (1992). 
 117. Delaware courts frequently have tried to gain the advantage of specific guidelines 
within general standards by providing directors “safe harbor” suggestions for processes that 
will clearly comply with fiduciary duties. E.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); Broz 
v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996). This is different, however, from mandat-
ing specific processes. 
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ees’ and Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust.118 In both, the Chan-
cery Court held that directors, in sales falling under Revlon, must conduct 
a market test or else establish their impeccable knowledge of the market. 
In both, the Delaware Supreme Court then reversed, explaining that 
Revlon does not require any particular procedure of directors. 
 Before filing this away under the heading trial courts make mistakes, 
it is edifying to ask how the Chancery Court managed to get this wrong. 
In fact, the Chancery Court was following guidance the Delaware Su-
preme Court had provided in Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc.119 This 
guidance began with the assurance that Revlon does not command a 
heated bidding contest (an auction) before any sale of control.120 The Su-
preme Court then broke down situations that might arise into two possi-
bilities. The first was multiple bidders competing for control. Here, the 
court admonished that fairness to the shareholders precludes using de-
fensive mechanisms to favor one bidder over another.121 This follows simi-
lar language in Revlon,122 but contradicts the court’s explanation in Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.,123 that favoritism is okay if justified by 
getting the best deal for the shareholders.124 
 The Delaware Supreme Court in Barken next discussed the situa-
tion in which there was only one bidder.125 In this circumstance, the 
court stated that unless the directors have reliable grounds for de-
termining if the one bid is adequate, they must canvass the market to 
determine if higher bids might be available. Moreover, in comment-
ing on what might constitute reliable information sufficient to forgo 
canvassing the market, the court cautioned that the advice of an in-
vestment banker is often a poor substitute for a market test to de-
termine the adequacy of a single bid.126 
 Given this discussion, it is not surprising that the Chancery Court 
thought that directors in a Revlon situation without competing bid-
ders must test the market unless they can establish their impeccable 
knowledge of the market. Moreover, given the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s shifting statements regarding process and Revlon, it is 
somewhat understandable that the Chancery Court was not totally 
convinced by the reversal in Lyondell, and so the Delaware Supreme 
                                                                                                                                        
 118. 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014). 
 119. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989). 
 120. Id. at 1286-87. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986). 
 123. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988). 
 124. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286-87. 
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Court in C&J Energy again had to reverse a Chancery Court decision 
holding that Revlon requires market tests or impeccable board 
knowledge of the market.127 Interestingly, however, the Delaware 
Supreme Court in C&J Energy could not quite itself completely dis-
miss the notion that Revlon might command some sort of market 
test. Instead, it pointed out that the case involved a “passive test” 
insofar as the board retained a “fiduciary out” provision allowing it to 
abandon the merger if a better deal happened to come along and the 
deal protection devices in the merger agreement were modest.128 In-
deed, the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in RBC contains 
a discussion quoting C&J Energy as standing for the necessity of 
market tests.129 
(c)   Heightened Scrutiny 
 The final impact of Revlon is a notion of heightened scrutiny. Indeed, 
the Delaware Supreme Court once scolded an attorney for referring “in-
appropriately” to “Revlon duties” in order to describe the “enhanced scru-
tiny courts accord to certain types of transactions.”130 What this enhanced 
scrutiny entails, however, is not entirely clear. 
 There are two possibilities for Revlon increasing scrutiny over Unocal 
and where it might fit into the overall standards for reviewing director 
decisions: (1) Revlon might establish a new intermediate standard which 
is more demanding than Unocal, albeit less demanding than the fairness 
test; and (2) Revlon might extend heightened scrutiny to situations previ-
ously covered by the business judgment rule standard. 
 The best source for answering whether scrutiny under Revlon is more 
demanding than scrutiny under Unocal should have been QVC, since the 
court distinguished Time, in which it applied Unocal, from the case before 
it, in which it applied Revlon. Unfortunately, in terms of clarity, the court 
in QVC spoke of Revlon as both narrowing the acceptable goals for direc-
tors and enhancing the scrutiny applied by the court131—thereby making 
                                                                                                                                        
 127. In fact, the Delaware Chancery Court adhered to this market test or impeccable 
knowledge formulation in other decisions following Lyondell and before being reversed again 
in C&J Energy. See, e.g., In re OPENLANE, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 
4599662 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 128. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps., 107 A.3d 1049, 1070 (Del. 
2014). 
 129. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816, 854 (Del. 2015) (“Revlon permits a 
board to pursue the transaction it reasonably views as most valuable to the stockholders, 
provided ‘the transaction is subject to an effective market check under circumstances in 
which any bidder interested in paying more has a reasonable opportunity to do so.’ ” (quoting 
C&J Energy Servs., Inc., 107 A.3d at 1066)). 
 130. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289 n.40 (Del. 1994). 
 131. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1993). 
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it unclear whether Revlon differs from Unocal by adding to scrutiny un-
der Unocal a narrowing of the acceptable goal, or by both narrowing the 
goal and increasing the scrutiny relative to Unocal. Nor did the court’s 
analysis of the situation in front of it clarify the matter. Specifically, the 
passage in which the court states that Paramount’s directors could not 
justify, based upon their vision of future strategy, taking a bid with $1 
billion less market value than the competing bid might mean that direc-
tors must focus their attention on getting the most value for the share-
holders as measured by market prices or could reflect a greater level of 
scrutiny under which the court examines market prices and other factors 
to decide for itself whether the shareholders got the best value. 
 Beyond the question of whether Revlon creates a higher level of scru-
tiny than Unocal, there is also the question of whether Revlon extends an 
intermediate level of scrutiny to situations not covered by Unocal and, 
hence, otherwise subject to evaluation under the deferential approach of 
the business judgment rule (or even limited to assessment of whether the 
directors acted in good faith if a Section 102(b)(7) waiver applies). Lyon-
dell illustrates this issue. Lyondell involved the sort of cash-out merger 
negotiated with a solitary bidder reminiscent of Van Gorkom, where the 
plaintiff at least nominally had to establish the directors were grossly 
negligent in order to prevail under the business judgment rule.132 Moreo-
ver, Lyondell’s certificate of incorporation contained a provision, as al-
lowed by Section 102(b)(7), waiving liability of directors for monetary 
damages except for actions not in good faith.133 Yet, the court in Lyondell 
treated the case as a sale of control coming within Revlon,134 which sug-
gests more rigorous scrutiny of the board’s action than either the business 
judgment rule or good faith standards. 
 The Delaware Supreme Court in Lyondell found it necessary for the 
plaintiff to establish a lack of good faith.135 Yet, all this may show is that 
certificates of incorporation can waive monetary damages from Revlon 
claims so long as the directors acted in good faith. Such waivers, however, 
do not apply to actions pursuing an injunction.136 Indeed, in its recent 
Corwin decision,137 the Delaware Supreme Court went even further in 
                                                                                                                                        
 132. Since Van Gorkom predates Revlon, however, it is possible that the Delaware Su-
preme Court would have applied Revlon to Van Gorkom had the order of the decisions been 
reversed. 
 133. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239 (Del. 2009). 
 134. See id. at 242-43. 
 135. Id. at 243. 
 136. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (can waive claims for monetary damages). 
Section 102(b)(7) also refers only to claims against directors, not officers, thereby still leaving 
the Revlon standard to govern claims that officers breached their duty in negotiating a sale or 
merger. E.g., Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 137. Corwin v. Fin. Hldgs. LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).  
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looking to the remedy sought as the way to reconcile scrutiny under 
Revlon versus scrutiny under either the business judgment rule or for 
good faith. In holding that the business judgment rule applied to the 
plaintiffs’ damage action even if the challenged merger came within 
Revlon,138 the court in Corwin observed that Revlon was designed for cas-
es seeking an injunction, not damages.139 The basis for this distinction 
seems to be that greater scrutiny is okay when courts kibitz in real time, 
rather than when after-the-fact liability for damages is at stake. 
 Corwin, however, further complicates the issue of heightened scrutiny 
by also ruling that a fully informed, non-coerced shareholder vote returns 
scrutiny to the business judgment rule even in a Revlon situation.140 Yet, 
if the court issues an injunction against the deal before the shareholders 
vote, then there is no shareholder approval to bring the standard to the 
business judgment rule. On the other hand, it seems strange to employ 
heightened scrutiny as to whether directors acted appropriately to get the 
best price in order to prevent the shareholders from having the opportuni-
ty to vote in a manner that would cause the court to defer under the busi-
ness judgment rule to the board’s decision.  
D.   Mixing Things Up: Conflating Disloyalty and Power Goals When 
Reviewing Deal Protections and Shotgun Corporate Marriages 
 If Revlon provides a doctrine largely disconnected from the goals for 
judicial review as normally applied, Delaware’s approach to deal protec-
tions and shotgun corporate marriages tries to connect to these goals but 
loses its way. 
4.   Omnicare Prescribes Unocal 
 Revlon and QVC struck down lock-ups and other deal protections be-
cause, as employed in these cases, they seemed to be interfering with, ra-
ther than facilitating, getting the best price—contrary to the objective re-
quired of the board under the Revlon doctrine. In Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc.,141 the Delaware Supreme Court addressed fiduciary du-
ty limits on deal protection devices in cases not governed by Revlon. 
                                                                                                                                        
 138. This case involved a merger between an LLC and a limited partnership to which the 
court only applied corporate law doctrines, such as Revlon, because the parties all took the 
position that corporate law doctrines governed. Id. at 306 n.3. Since the merger was an equity 
exchange (stock-for-stock in corporate speak) with a publicly traded buyer—albeit one subject 
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Revlon applied even if one treated this as a corporate law case. Id. at 308 n.12. 
 139. Id. at 312. 
 140. Id. at 308. 
 141. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
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 NCS was in financial distress, having defaulted on its debts.142 Its 
board sought a cure in potential buyers.143 Two other healthcare firms 
were interested in acquiring NCS: Omnicare and Genesis.144 After various 
competing proposals and negotiations, Genesis offered a merger that 
would fully pay all of NCS’s debts and give some Genesis stock to NCS 
shareholders.145 Genesis, however, demanded a pair of deal protections: 
(1) a promise by NCS’s directors to submit the merger to a vote by NCS’s 
shareholders even if a better deal came along that caused the board to 
withdraw its recommendation supporting the merger; (2) an agreement 
by the chair of NCS’s board and its CEO, who between them owned 
shares possessing a majority of the votes,146 to vote for the merger.147 Tak-
ing the sure deal over the risk that Omnicare was simply toying with it 
while hoping to force a bankruptcy sale after Genesis departed, NCS’s 
board and controlling shareholders agreed to the Genesis offer with its 
deal protections.148 Omnicare responded with a cash tender offer and a 
lawsuit to invalidate the deal protections.149 
 The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis with the question of 
what is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply.150 The Genesis merger 
did not fall within Revlon, because it was a stock-for-stock merger with a 
company lacking a controlling shareholder.151 The Supreme Court as-
sumed that the business judgment rule protected the decision to merge 
with Genesis.152 When it came to agreeing to the deal protections, howev-
er, the court decided on a different level of review: it held that Unocal pro-
vided the appropriate standard.153 
 Having decided to import Unocal, the Omnicare court brought along 
all of the Unocal formula as refined in later decisions. This means requir-
ing the directors to prove, first, that they had reasonable grounds for 
agreeing to the deal protection devices (here, the threat that NCS would 
otherwise lose the Genesis deal and find itself without any better offer), 
and second, that the devices were reasonable in relation to this threat.154 
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To establish this second element, the court in Omnicare also imported the 
two-part inquiry from the court’s Unitrin decision.155 This requires that 
the deal protections not be coercive or preclusive and that they be within 
a range of reasonable responses. Because the combined impact of the di-
rectors’ and the controlling shareholders’ promises guaranteed that the 
merger would take place, the court in Omnicare condemned the deal pro-
tections as coercive and preclusive.156 In a second part of the opinion, the 
court also condemned the deal protections on the alternate ground that 
the directors must leave themselves an “effective fiduciary out” in order to 
meet a continuing fiduciary obligation to take a better deal if one comes 
along after entering the merger agreement.157 
 Courts in some other states have explicitly rejected Unocal, as opposed 
to the business judgment rule, as the standard against which to review 
directors’ agreeing to deal protection devices.158 Indeed, Omnicare’s rea-
sons for scrutiny under Unocal conflate and confuse the goals potentially 
justifying this standard. 
 The court had essentially two reasons for applying Unocal. The simple 
reason is that the purpose and effect of deal protection devices is to fight 
off competing offers. In this sense, deal protection devices operate like poi-
son pills or other defenses against tender offers, which are subject to re-
view under Unocal. 
 Yet, this sort of simple reasoning fails to ask a fundamental question 
(that the court also failed to ask in Revlon): Which of the goals for judicial 
review justified heightened scrutiny in Unocal? Unocal’s express concern 
about the omnipresent specter that directors might be acting to preserve 
their positions159 indicates that the basis for heightened scrutiny is to pro-
tect against disloyalty. This potential disloyalty is inherent when (as in 
Unocal) resistance to a takeover keeps the corporation independent, and 
thus the current directors in their positions. When, however, as in Om-
nicare (or in Revlon), the company will be sold, it is no longer automatical-
ly true that the current directors will keep their positions. If they do not, 
Unocal’s omnipresent specter disappears. 
 The court in Omnicare also invoked another potentially deeper ra-
tionale. This was to find “conflicts of interest”160 in the tension between 
the directors’ desire to have their way on a merger and the statutory pow-
er granted the shareholders to vote contrary to the board’s wishes. While 
the court no doubt invoked the term conflicts of interest in order to fall 
                                                                                                                                        
 155. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1386-88 (Del. 1995). 
 156. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935-36. 
 157. Id. at 936-39. 
 158. E.g., Monty v. Leis, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 159. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 160. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 930. 
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within the traditional rubric under which conflicts of interest remove 
transactions from the business judgment rule and justify higher scrutiny, 
the use of the expression in Omnicare is quite different from the tradi-
tional understanding. 
 Normally, one thinks of conflicts of interest as situations, such as di-
rectors entering contracts between themselves and their corporation, in 
which the directors can gain some financial advantage by making deci-
sions that are not in the best financial interest of the corporation or its 
shareholders. Unocal fits within this normal understanding insofar as the 
directors’ financial, as well as non-financial interest, in retaining their 
positions can lead them to oppose a tender offer that would remove them 
from the board, even though accepting the offer might be the most profit-
able decision for the shareholders. 
 This, however, is not the sort of conflicts of interest referred to in Om-
nicare. Instead, the court is treating the mere desire to have one’s way on 
the transaction by preventing a shareholder veto as a conflict of interest. 
Perhaps the court is expanding the concept of “interest” that can be in 
conflict to include not just financial and other benefits that result from a 
decision, but the interest in possessing the raw power to decide—in which 
case board choices affecting the allocation of power create a conflict of in-
terest because more power for the board is less for the shareholders (and 
vice versa). Perhaps the court is concerned that the motive to get one’s 
way on a decision is often such a strong force that it can cloud one’s judg-
ment. Perhaps the court is using board efforts to force a decision on the 
shareholders as a signal that maybe there is a more conventional conflict 
of interest hidden in the deal. In any event, this is a very different concep-
tion of conflicts of interest. 
 Actually, it really was not necessary for the court to try to fit the 
square peg of protecting the shareholders’ veto into the round hole of 
protecting against board disloyalty by invoking conflicts of interest. A 
direct approach is simply to recognize the third goal for judicial re-
view of board actions—this being to referee power disputes between 
the board and shareholders. 
 Ironically, while the power concern thus could justify heightened 
scrutiny for some deal protections, it does not reach the defenses be-
fore the court in Omnicare. Indeed, Omnicare’s mistake is to assume 
that all deal protection devices potentially undermine shareholder 
power and then, to illustrate why this assumption is wrong, pick out 
two promises that did not undermine shareholder power. The share-
holder voting agreement was an exercise by the shareholders in re-
spect to their voting power, rather than a board imposed reduction of 
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the shareholders’ power.161 The board’s promise to bring the merger 
to a vote no matter what, decreased, not increased, the power of the 
board vis-à-vis the voting power of the shareholders. 
5.   Applying Unocal Scrutiny to Specific Devices 
 There are a variety of deal protection devices and their acceptability 
under Unocal (or Revlon for that matter162) in an individual case may de-
pend upon the specific device, the combined impact of the various devices 
employed in the particular agreement, and the overall context of the deal. 
It is analytically useful to break the discussion down by the identity of the 
party who carries out the promise involved in the specific device and then 
turn to the impact of context. In some cases, the results correspond to the 
goals for judicial review of board decisions; in other cases, they do not; 
and, in either event, this is often rather random. 
(a)   Shareholder Promises 
 The deal protection devices in Omnicare differed from those in 
earlier cases, such as Revlon and QVC, in the inclusion of promises 
by shareholders holding a majority of the votes. This is something 
that is impractical in the more common cases involving companies 
with entirely dispersed ownership.  
 Omnicare found the voting promise coercive and preclusive because, 
when combined with the directors’ promise to bring the merger to a vote, 
it preordained the Genesis merger despite the arrival of a better deal pre-
ferred by NCS’s public shareholders.163 The preclusive label is literally 
true, because the agreements rendered this a done deal, thereby preclud-
ing consideration of other offers. Of course, all merger agreements are 
preclusive in this sense after the shareholders vote to approve, and the 
court never explains what is magic about becoming preclusive before, ver-
sus after, the formal vote, so long as the holders of a majority of the votes 
voluntarily decided to support the merger. The characterization of the 
agreement as coercive is also strange. True, the public shareholders 
lacked the votes to block the merger despite owning most of the equity in 
NCS; but this is a function of super voting stock and a shareholder voting 
agreement—both accepted parts of Delaware and other states’ corporate 
                                                                                                                                        
 161. True, one of the parties to the agreement was chairman of the board. However, a 
directors’ voting of his or her shares is not transferring power from shareholders to the board. 
 162. Presumably, devices that do not pass muster under Unocal as applied by Omnicare 
will not pass muster under the more demanding Revlon standard. E.g., Davidoff & Sautter, 
supra note 24, at 702-03. But see Restrepo & Subramanian, supra note 24, at 33-37 (explain-
ing uncertainty in Delaware cases as to whether deal protections in situations falling under 
Revlon could be acceptable even if they do not meet Omnicare’s test but arguing against this 
interpretation). 
 163. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 936. 
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law.164 Otherwise, the agreement was only coercive in the sense that ma-
jority rule is always coercive on the outvoted minority, but such is the na-
ture of democratic governance and longstanding corporate law allowing 
approval of mergers by majority rather than unanimous vote.165 
 Subsequent Delaware Chancery Court decisions indicate that share-
holder actions can be part of deal protections, even when the result is to 
quickly preclude competing bids and the opportunity to get a potentially 
better deal. In a pair of cases, the Chancery Court rejected challenges to 
mergers in which shareholders having a majority of the votes provided 
written consents to approve the merger within a day of the board’s enter-
ing the merger agreement.166 As the Chancery Court explained, nothing 
in Delaware’s corporation statute requires a minimum period before 
shareholders can approve a merger by written consent.167 Hence, the up-
shot of Omnicare as far as locking up the sale of corporations when a 
small number of insiders have a majority of the votes might be that par-
ties simply should use written consents rather than voting agreements.168 
                                                                                                                                        
 164. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(a) (2015) (corporation may issue different classes 
of stock having different voting rights); 281(c) (allowing shareholder voting agreements); 
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 6.01 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (corporation may issue different classes 
of stock having different voting rights); 7.31(a) (allowing shareholder voting agreements). 
 165. See supra note 5. 
 166. In re OPENLANE, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662 (Del. Ch. 
Sept., 2011); Optima Int’l of Miami, Inc. v. WCI Steel, Inc., No. 3833-VCL (Del. Ch. June 27, 
2008), (transcript of ruling available at, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/mergers/ 
files/_0702120713_001.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5CS-LSBJ]) (bench ruling denying preliminary 
injunction). Interestingly, in OPENLANE, the plaintiff did not challenge the use of written 
consents, although the plaintiff complained that board members held shares with enough 
votes to pass the merger. The court pointed to the impact of the consents in rendering this 
effectively a done deal as minimizing the practical relevance of a no-solicitation provision 
about which the plaintiff complained. 
 167. Optima, No. 3833-VCL, at transcript 127. Delaware’s corporation statute requires a 
minimum 20-day notice before the shareholder meeting at which shareholders vote to ap-
prove a merger (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c)), but Section 228(a) of Delaware’s corporation 
statute (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228) allows shareholders to act without a meeting and with-
out advance notice if shareholders holding enough votes to approve the relevant action pro-
vide written consent. Federal proxy rules, where applicable, impose a minimum 20-day delay 
before actions approved by written shareholder consent can take effect—this for the purpose 
mandating that all shareholders who were entitled to vote receive information about the ac-
tion. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c–2. This, however, delays closing, not approval. 
 168. Provisions in the agreement allowing the buyer to walk away from the deal without 
negative consequence if the majority does not provide written consent to the merger create 
the incentive for quick action by the majority. 
Another approach used in mergers post-Omnicare is to include a so-called “fall away” 
provision in the shareholder voting agreement. Under such a provision, the arrival of a supe-
rior bid allows enough shareholders to opt out of their promise to vote for the merger that the 
number of committed votes falls below a majority, thereby avoiding the merger technically 
being a fait accompli. Since the holders of the votes allowed opting out often have other rea-
sons for favoring the original merger, the result of the fall away provision may be largely 
cosmetic. Brian JM Quinn, Omnicare: Coercion and the New Unocal Standard, 38 J. CORP. L. 
835, 845-46 (2013). 
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(b)   Board Promises 
 Discussion of what the board can and cannot promise to do in a 
merger agreement begins at a simple point: directors cannot promise 
to do things that would breach their fiduciary duty.169 Of course, this 
leads to the question of what such things are. To answer this ques-
tion, it is helpful to break the discussion into three categories: (1) 
dealings with the shareholders; (2) gatekeeping; and (3) dealings 
with potential competing bidders.170 
 Dealings with the shareholders leads to the easiest case: directors 
cannot promise to withhold material facts about the merger (such as in-
formation about a potentially better deal) from the shareholders.171 Not 
only is disclosure part of directors’172 (or, indeed, any agent’s173) basic fidu-
ciary duty, but assuring disclosure is also consistent with Omnicare’s un-
derlying concern about protecting shareholder power and part of the goal 
of refereeing power disputes. After all, shareholders cannot effectively 
exercise their power if they do not possess the facts. 
 One complication, however, regarding disclosure to shareholders aris-
es with promises by the board to recommend that the shareholders ap-
prove the merger. Suppose by the time of the vote the directors no longer 
think that the merger is such a good idea. In that case, recommending 
approval without disclosing that the directors no longer support the deal 
seems to be misleading. Merger agreements typically attempt to address 
this problem through provisions allowing directors to forgo recommending 
the merger if required by their fiduciary duty (fiduciary outs).174 If the 
                                                                                                                                        
 169. E.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 n.74 (Del. 2003) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 193 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)). 
 170. While these three categories encompass board promises that directly serve as deal 
protection devices, other promises of the board (such as a generic best efforts promise to seek 
to implement the agreement) might indirectly serve as a deal protection by setting up a claim 
for tortious interference with contract against any competing prospective buyers who manage 
to breakup the deal. E.g., Jewel Cos., Inc. v. Pay Less Drug Stores Nw., Inc., 741 F.2d 1555 
(9th Cir. 1984). Discussion of such interference claims is beyond the scope of this Article. Suf-
fice it to say that courts, both in determining whether the defendant unjustifiably interfered 
with a contract, and, if so, in assessing damages, must keep in mind that even if some sort of 
contract exists before shareholders vote to approve the merger, the agreement to merge, it-
self, is not a binding contract before that point. This means, for example, that even if a mer-
ger partner demonstrates a later bidder enticed a board to break a best efforts promise by not 
bringing the merger to a shareholder vote, there would be no damages from interfering with 
the best efforts promise without proof that the shareholders would have approved the original 
merger in the face of a better offer. 
 171. E.g., ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576, 586 (Neb. 1986). 
 172. E.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998). 
 173. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 174. E.g., Clare O’Brien & Rory O’Halloran, The Board’s Prerogative and Mergers, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 28, 2015), http:// 
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/28/the-boards-prerogative-and-mergers/ [https://perma.cc/ 
ZH2J-LDEX]. 
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trigger for a fiduciary out is simply that the directors have changed their 
minds about the merits of the merger, then the promise to recommend 
that the shareholders approve the merger, combined with a fiduciary out 
allowing directors not to make this recommendation if the directors 
change their minds, turn into a null set in which the directors may as well 
not have made the promise to recommend the merger. 
 Merger agreements often attempt to give real effect to the promise to 
recommend the merger by limiting the fiduciary out to defined events, 
such as a superior offer (as defined in the agreement). Agreements also 
often require the board to engage in a process—such as getting an opinion 
from an attorney that the board was required to change its recommenda-
tion in order to comply with its fiduciary duty—prior to changing its rec-
ommendation.175 The problem with such provisions is that the directors 
are then promising not to accurately state to the shareholders the direc-
tors’ subjective views about the merger at the time the shareholders vote, 
since the directors may no longer support the merger based upon circum-
stances which do not match the defined fiduciary out. 
 Curiously, there have been no judicial rulings on whether directors’ 
disclosure obligations preclude promises to recommend a merger unless a 
defined fiduciary out arises—perhaps because this is a moot point until 
someone tries to enforce the promise in a situation in which the directors 
change their recommendation. Statements from the Chancery Court sug-
gest such provisions might be unenforceable.176 
 Delaware’s corporation statute allows directors to bring a merger 
to a shareholder vote that will decide the fate of the transaction even 
if the board no longer recommends the merger.177 This, in turn, al-
lows merger agreements to avoid the disclosure problem just dis-
cussed by having the board promise to bring the deal to the share-
holders regardless of the board’s views at the time of the shareholder 
vote (a “force the vote” provision). Omnicare, however, indicates that 
the board may not so easily contract out of a gatekeeping responsibil-
ity to block mergers it no longer supports. 
 The fact that Omnicare boils down to the need for directors to preserve 
their own gatekeeping power (at least when the shareholder vote is pre-
committed) is ironic, because it stands Omnicare’s rationale for adopting 
Unocal scrutiny on its head. The court in Omnicare adopted Unocal, in 
substantial part, because of the conflict between the board’s desire to get 
its way on a transaction and the shareholders’ right to vote against the 
                                                                                                                                        
 175. Id. 
 176. In re NYSE Euronext S’holders Litig., No. 8136-CS, 13 (Del. Ch. May 10, 2013) 
(transcript of ruling available at, http://www.rlf.com/files/6884_NE051013Rulings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B8T5-QVR8]). 
 177. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 146 (2015). 
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board’s wishes. How the court can get from this concern to a holding es-
sentially that a board must preserve the board’s own power to change its 
mind and block the shareholders from a vote is amazing. Indeed, Unocal 
scrutiny serves to check the board’s assumption of gatekeeping power,178 
not to demand the board maximize it. 
 In any event, Omnicare leaves the question of whether, in situations in 
which there is no shareholder agreement locking up the vote, a board can 
promise that it will bring a merger to a shareholder vote even if before the 
vote there is a better offer for the company. The final part of the court’s 
opinion presented, as an alternate ground for its decision, the holding that 
directors must leave themselves an “effective fiduciary out.”179 Some have 
read this to prohibit the board from ever making an agreement that 
would prevent it from canceling the vote in the event of a superior offer.180 
On the other hand, Omnicare continued to invoke the impact of the 
shareholders’ agreement even in this portion of the opinion. Perhaps this 
is because, without the shareholder voting agreement, full disclosure of a 
superior bid provides (if we assume shareholders are not stupid) an effec-
tive out even if the merger comes to a vote.181 
 Finally, and most complex, are board promises regarding dealings 
with potential competing bidders before the shareholder vote. These run a 
spectrum in terms of their restrictive impact from (at the least restrictive 
end) provisions in the merger agreement expressly allowing solicitation of 
competing bids (“go-shops”), to prohibitions against actively soliciting oth-
er bids (“no-shops” as narrowly defined), to requirements that the board 
give the existing merger partner an opportunity to put forward a new of-
fer to meet any superior bid (“matching rights”), to (at the most restrictive 
end) prohibitions against cooperation or communication with another 
prospective bidder (“no-talks,” albeit sometimes referred to as a no-shop 
                                                                                                                                        
 178. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 16, at 1493-97 (discussing how Unocal responds to the 
directors’ assumption of a gatekeeping power to block the sale of the corporation through 
tender offers, which corporation statutes do not explicitly provide to the board). 
 179. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 918 (Del. 2003). 
 180. Id. at 943 (Del. 2003) (Veasey, C.J., dissenting); In re OPENLANE, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, *10 n.53 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011). Nevertheless, 
force the vote provisions continue to be found in merger agreements, with the general decline 
in the use of such provisions after Omnicare being no greater in mergers involving Delaware 
corporations than in mergers involving corporations formed under the laws of states in which 
Omnicare does not govern. Megan W. Shaner, Revisiting Omnicare: What Does Its Status 10 
Years Later Tell Us?, 38 J. CORP. L. 865, 880 (2013). 
 181. One caveat to this conclusion arises if there will be significant delay before the 
shareholder vote can take place, during which time the superior offer is effectively blocked. 
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-
Stock Merger Agreements, 56 BUS. LAW. 919, 937-38 (2001). This suggests that the accepta-
bility of a force the vote provision (when shareholders remain free to vote down the deal) 
might depend upon the amount of dawdling allowed. 
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under a broader use of that term).182 Also, instead of making a promise 
regarding its own conduct, the seller’s board may curb later contacts with 
competing bidders by extracting “standstill” agreements with “don’t ask, 
don’t waive” terms from prospective bidders. In a standstill, a prospective 
bidder agrees (commonly in exchange for access to confidential company 
information) not to launch a tender offer. The don’t ask, don’t waive term 
adds a promise not to publicly ask (or even to ask the board privately) for 
a waiver of the standstill after the board has selected a different buyer.183 
 Determining what is acceptable with regard to board promises curbing 
dealings with prospective competing bidders is complicated, not only be-
cause of variations in such promises and their particular impacts, but, on 
a more fundamental level, because this involves two distinct concerns—
both of which only partially correlate to the goals for judicial review. Spe-
cifically, there is the promise’s impact of stifling the emergence of compet-
ing bids, and there is the promise’s impact upon information reaching the 
board about the prospect for such bids. 
 This difference in the underlying concerns, in turn, creates a couple of 
doctrinal impacts. To begin with, the prospect of stifling competing bids 
might arguably have more salience to Revlon situations, with its height-
ened focus on obtaining the best deal, than to review under Omnicare 
outside of Revlon. By comparison, agreements that cut off information to 
the board seem to come squarely within Omnicare’s recognition of contin-
uing fiduciary obligations for the board. Moreover, Delaware Chancery 
Court judges have recognized that directors might reasonably trade re-
ducing prospects for later competing bids in exchange for getting an offer, 
or better terms in an offer, right now.184 By comparison, it seems more 
problematic to assert that directors should be able to horse-trade when it 
comes to being sufficiently informed to carry out their obligation to fully 
inform the shareholders of all material facts up to the vote. 
 Turning to some of the specific promises, the court in QVC drew a dis-
tinction between agreements not to actively solicit competing bids and 
agreements not to consider unsolicited bids or negotiate with unsolicited 
bidders.185 While this was in the context of Revlon with its imperative for 
the board to get the best deal, subsequent Delaware Chancery Court deci-
sions have drawn a similar distinction without regard to whether the sit-
                                                                                                                                        
 182. See, e.g., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., ABA, MODEL MERGER AGREEMENT FOR 
THE ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC COMPANY 150, 161, 164 (2011) (discussing provisions in merger 
contract for go-shops, no-shops, notice of competing offers, and no-talks). 
 183. Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made to Be Broken? Standstill Agreements in 
Change of Control Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929, 931 (2013). 
 184. E.g., In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1015-21 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 185. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49 n.20 (Del. 1993). 
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uation falls within Revlon.186 This distinction may be justified by both of 
the impacts just discussed. The failure to formally solicit other possible 
buyers might not have much impact on getting other bids given that pub-
lic announcement of a pending merger shows the company is for sale.187 It 
also does not cut a board off from information that prospective competing 
bidders are trying to put right in front of it. By contrast, refusal to provide 
information to or negotiate with other prospective bidders might not only 
significantly impede their ability to put forth a better offer, but also is pa-
tently blinding the board to information relevant both to its duty to fully 
inform shareholders and to the continuing gatekeeping obligation im-
posed by Omnicare.188 
 Since matching rights, while creating some disincentive for smaller 
topping bids,189 are less likely to deter a prospective competing bidder 
planning a significant jump, and also do not cut off information to the 
board,190 we might expect greater tolerance by the court toward matching 
rights than toward no-talks. This appears to be the case in Chancery 
Court decisions dealing with matching rights.191 
 Standstill agreements present a difficult problem. Standstills with 
‘don’t ask, don’t waive’ terms cut off information to the board and the 
shareholders, which led some Chancery Court decisions to either invali-
date or suggest the court might invalidate such agreements.192 On the 
other hand, a bench ruling by then Chancellor Strine193 recognized the 
                                                                                                                                        
 186. E.g., Ace Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 106-08 (Del. Ch. 1999) (drawing a 
distinction between no solicitation and no-talk provisions and questioning the legality of 
the latter whether or not the situation falls within Revlon). The result has been that mer-
ger agreements stopped using stronger no-talks. Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 24, at 683 
n.13; see also ABA Model Agreement, supra note 182, at 4.4 (including a no-talk with a 
fiduciary out). 
 187. Albeit it is possible that prospective acquirers might not be on the lookout for such 
announcements by small cap. companies. 
 188. E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. CIV.A. 17398, CIV.A. 
17383, CIV.A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999). 
 189. Since prospective competing bidders might ask what is the point of investing time 
into preparing a competing bid if the first merger partner will just match the new slightly 
better offer? 
 190. Except insofar as competing bids simply do not materialize. 
 191. E.g., Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 24, at 705 (Chancery Court has repeatedly up-
held matching rights). 
 192. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471, at *21-22 (Del. 
Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (approving a settlement that removed the standstill); In re Complete Ge-
nomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 7888-VCL, at *14-18 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012) (transcript of 
ruling available at, https://jenner.com/system/assets/assets/6921/original/Complete_ 
20Genomics_20Transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T2P-GQRA]) (holding provision invalid); In 
re Rehabcare Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL, at 46 (Del. Ch. 2011) (question-
ing the validity of a standstill with a don’t ask, don’t waive term). 
 193. In re Ancestry.com, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) (tran-
script of ruling available at, http://www.wlrk.com/docs/121712%20Ancestry%20ruling.pdf) 
(motion for preliminary injunction). 
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utility of such agreements in forcing parties to present the board with 
their best offer during an auction, rather than holding back, figuring that 
they can always come back later with the lure of a better bid to breakup 
the deal prevailing in the auction. Strine’s suggested solution to reconcile 
this utility with the board’s disclosure obligation is to disclose to the 
shareholders the standstill. 
(c)   Corporate Promises 
 Deal protections often involve promises of corporate performance—
specifically to pay termination fees or to sell some assets or stock cheaply 
(asset and stock lock-ups) if the merger or sale does not take place. These 
provide a consolation prize for the jilted buyer. They also can punish 
shareholders for voting contrary to the board’s wishes, as well as deter 
other bidders by lowering the value of the corporation and its outstanding 
stock if the proposed merger or sale does not take place.194 
 Both Revlon and QVC involved this sort of deal protection—an asset 
lock-up in Revlon and a stock lock-up and termination fees in QVC. While 
the court in Revlon was only concerned about how the board used the 
lock-up, the court in QVC condemned aspects of the lock-up itself as dra-
conian.195 While this came in the context of applying scrutiny under 
Revlon, the bar on draconian actions is actually part of Unocal.196 
 The Delaware Supreme Court returned to corporate promise deal 
protections in Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.197 Interestingly, the court 
dealt with the termination fees challenged in that case under the ru-
bric of acceptable liquidated damages rather than fiduciary duty. This 
categorization seems odd given that a shareholder vote against the 
merger would hardly constitute a breach of the merger contract. The 
contract, however, characterized the fees in this manner and the plain-
tiff, because the case predates Omnicare and did not involve a Revlon 
situation, used this as a tool to get out of the business judgment rule. 
In any event, while the question of whether termination fees are rea-
sonable in the contract law liquidated damages context is not the same 
as whether they meet the multistage reasonableness inquiry under 
                                                                                                                                        
 194. E.g., Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 337-53 (discussing impacts of 
termination fees and asset and stock lock-ups). For many years prior to a change in account-
ing rules that made this irrelevant, granting a stock option of sufficient size also prevented 
any other possible acquirer from obtaining desirable pooling of interest accounting, thereby 
further deterring some later bids. E.g., Strine, supra note 181, at 922 n.7. 
 195. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 49, 51 (Del. 1993). 
 196. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Indeed, given that 
the other deal protection condemned in QVC, the no-talk, also probably would flunk even the 
Unocal /Omnicare standard, one is led to wonder whether the whole discussion of whether to 
apply Revlon can now be seen as just a big red herring in QVC. 
 197. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997). 
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Unocal; the court stated that the tests were in some respects analo-
gous.198 The court pointed particularly to the part of Unocal requiring 
the board’s response to be within a range of reasonableness. 
 The court held that the $550 million termination fee was a reasonable 
estimate of damages rather than an impermissible penalty.199 In part, the 
court based this upon a comparison of the size of the fee measured as a 
percentage of the corporation’s market capitalization, with the size of fees 
(similarly measured) held to be reasonable in prior Delaware Chancery 
Court opinions. In addition, the court pointed to the analysis the parties 
had undertaken in setting the fee of the costs they had incurred. Signifi-
cantly, in terms of the dollars involved, this included not just out of pocket 
costs, but also the lost opportunity costs associated with only dealing with 
the other party to the merger contract. 
 The condemnation of an asset lock-up in Revlon and a stock lock-up in 
QVC, juxtaposed against the acceptance of a termination fee in Brazen, 
appears to have contributed to a decline in the use of asset and stock lock-
ups and an increase in the size of termination fees, turning such fees into 
the primary corporate promise deal protections.200 At first glance, one 
must wonder whether M&A attorneys are overreacting to what might be 
coincidental differences in bottom line results. On the other hand, the 
court’s concern in QVC with the lack of a cap on how much money the 
stock lock-up will translate into does point to a difference between asset 
and stock lock-ups and termination fees. Termination fees commonly are 
fixed in an amount that one might attempt to justify as an estimate of 
costs incurred by the jilted bidder,201 but the payoff from an asset or stock 
lock-up is not.202 
 While the court in Omnicare did not specifically address corporate 
promise deal protections, the opinion’s prohibition on deal protections 
that are coercive or preclusive provides a potentially useful structure 
                                                                                                                                        
 198. Id. at 49. 
 199. Id. 
 200. E.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Jacob J. Fedechko, The Role of Judicial Opinions in 
Shaping M&A Practice 12-13, (Widener U. Del. Law Sch., Working Paper No. 15-17, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2648350 [http://perma.cc/CDC5-BBNS]. On the other hand, the end 
of pooling of interest accounting removed this reason for stock option lock-ups. More recently, 
perhaps to avoid Delaware court decisions limiting the size of acceptable termination fees, 
asset lock-ups (in the form of licensing arrangements) and stock lock-ups (as part of financing 
arrangements) have made something of a comeback. Restrepo & Subramanian, supra note 
24, at 19-32.  
 201. So-called topping fees, however, are measured as a proportion of the amount by 
which the later superior bid exceeds the agreed merger price.  
 202. Condemning stock locks on this ground, however, might arguably be short sighted. 
Because the payoff for the jilted would-be buyer with the stock lock-up depends upon the 
price paid by the ultimately successful later buyer, there can be a desirable incentive for the 
party holding such a lock-up to encourage the sale of the corporation to a party willing to pay 
the highest price. Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 381.  
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to consider the two impacts of asset and stock lock-ups and termina-
tion fees: they might coerce shareholders into voting for the deal by 
penalizing negative votes and they might preclude other bids. Subse-
quent Chancery Court decisions have tended to focus much more on 
fees and lock-ups deterring later bids than on their pressuring the 
shareholders for a favorable vote.203 
 One reason for less focus on the coercive aspect of termination fees and 
asset and stock lock-ups comes from the Chancery Court’s analysis in 
McMillan v. Intercargo Corp.204 The court stated that the termination fee 
there would not deter a negative shareholder vote because the fee was 
only payable in the event that the company was quickly sold for more 
than the merger price—as opposed to becoming payable with a share-
holder rejection in the absence of a better deal (a “naked no” vote). The 
result has been to discourage use of fees triggered by naked no votes,205 as 
well as to shrink their size,206 thereby decreasing use of coercive fees. 
 A potentially greater obstacle to coercion claims comes from Brazen, 
where the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the termination fee 
impermissibly coerced the shareholders into voting for the merger.207 The 
court conceded that the fee might have influenced shareholders to vote for 
the deal in order to avoid damage to the company. Nevertheless, the court 
held that fee did not fall within the definition of coercion found in the 
court’s earlier decision in Williams v. Geier.208 In Williams, the Delaware 
Supreme Court (in addressing a shareholder vote to amend a company’s 
certificate of incorporation) stated that actions leading shareholders to 
vote for some reason other than the merits of the transaction they are 
asked to approve could constitute coercion.209 Applying this definition in 
Brazen, the court reasoned that because the termination fee was an inte-
gral part of the merger contract, the shareholders’ consideration of the 
                                                                                                                                        
 203. See, e.g., In re Atheros Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 
864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011); In re 3Com S’holders Litig., No. 5067–CC, 2009 
WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 119-
20 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 204. 768 A.2d 492, 505-06 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 205. E.g., Ely R. Levy, Note, Corporate Courtship Gone Sour: Applying a Bankruptcy 
Approach to Termination Fee Provisions in Merger and Acquisition Agreements, 30 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1361, 1389-90 (2002). 
 206. E.g., Daniel Wolf & David Fox, A Quick Survey of Recent Developments in Public 
M&A Deal Terms, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 22, 2011), 
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2011/05/22/a-quick-survey-of-recent-developments-in-public-
ma-deal-terms/ [https://perma.cc/DR73-BN5D]. 
 207. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 50 (Del. 1997). 
 208. 671 A.2d 1368, 1382-83 (Del. 1996) (citing Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Grp., Inc., 517 
A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986)). 
 209. Id. 
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fee’s impact was not a consideration of something other than the merits of 
the transaction, and, hence, not coercion.210 
 Of course, if this holding means that every provision in a merger con-
tract is part of the merits of the deal simply because it is in the contract 
and so no provision in the merger contract can constitute coercion, then a 
provision in a merger contract allowing one company to dynamite all of 
the other company’s property if the other company’s shareholders vote 
down the merger would not be coercion. What the court presumably 
meant was that insofar as the fee was an attempt to compensate the other 
side, rather than to pressure the shareholders, it was part of the deal’s 
merits and so not coercion. Given this, the question becomes whether the 
reasonable estimation of damages and coercion issues collapse entirely 
into one inquiry or whether to find coercion the court must find that the 
termination fee is so large that it both exceeds a reasonable estimate of 
damages and impacts how the shareholders vote (which might involve 
different levels). 
 In many cases, it might not matter whether one focuses on the lock-
up’s or termination fee’s impact of pressuring the shareholders or the im-
pact of deterring other bids (which could render the lock-up or fee preclu-
sive, even if not coercive). Still, in some cases, there may be a difference in 
impact.211 Moreover, as discussed earlier when dealing with board prom-
ises, the risk of deterring other possible bids in the future may be more 
salient in Revlon situations and might be traded for a bid (or a better bid) 
now; whereas coercion of the shareholders would go to the core of Om-
nicare’s concerns and might not be subject to trading for a deal now. Most 
fundamentally, coercing shareholders relates to the refereeing power dis-
putes goal for judicial review, whereas preclusion of other offers, barring 
context raising loyalty concerns, is simply another business judgment. 
 In any event, Delaware Chancery Court decisions, while disavowing a 
rule of thumb making termination fees of around three percent of the cor-
poration’s value okay,212 have repeatedly said that fees of around this per-
centage are okay.213 In part, this follows the approach in Brazen of com-
paring the fee at hand as a percentage of company value against the 
                                                                                                                                        
 210. Brazen, 695 A.2d at 50. 
 211. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster & Steven M. Haas, Judicial Scrutiny of Deal Protection 
Measures, 11 M&A LAW. 18 (2007) (arguing that courts should evaluate termination fees as a 
percentage of both enterprise value and equity value, as the former is relevant to preclusion 
of other bidders and the latter is relevant to coercion of shareholders). 
 212. E.g., La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1181 n.10 (Del. 
Ch. 2007). 
 213. E.g., Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 24, at 705 (two percent to four percent repeated-
ly upheld); Hamermesh & Fedechko, supra note 200, at 13-14 (three percent to four percent  
generally upheld). 
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magnitude of fees upheld in prior cases,214 which the Chancery Court has 
increasingly supplemented by referring to what is standard in merger 
contracts.215 In part, it reflects a casual assumption that other prospective 
bidders either are not going to be too impacted in their decision by fees of 
this magnitude or else would not be willing to pay enough more to lose 
sleep over anyway.216 By contrast, termination fees whose size relative to 
the size of the corporation makes them stand out like a sore thumb have 
attracted a negative reaction by the Chancery Court.217 As in Brazen, the 
degree to which the fee represents expenses incurred by the bidder is a 
factor, particularly in justifying larger percentage fees in the case of 
smaller acquired companies.218 
(d)   Impact of Context 
 The court’s reaction to deal protection devices not only depends upon 
the individual provision, but also upon the broader context. This context 
includes both the constellation of deal protections found in the merger 
agreement and also the background setting of the deal. 
 Omnicare, itself, illustrates how a pair of protections for the merger, 
which might have been acceptable individually, became unacceptable be-
cause of their combined impact. Along the same lines, the disincentive to 
competing bids, or the pressure on shareholders to vote for a merger, cre-
ated by individual fees, lock-ups, no-talks, and the like, add up to create a 
greater impact as the merger agreement aggregates a number of such 
                                                                                                                                        
 214. E.g., In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 
2028076 *21 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 707 (Del. Ch. 
2001); McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505-06 (Del. Ch. 2000) (fee was at the high 
end of what courts had approved). 
 215. In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 2011 WL 2028076, at *21; In re 
Atheros Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 4, 2011); In re 3Com S’holders Litig., No. 5067–CC, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 18, 2009). 
 216. E.g., McMillan, 768 A.2d at 505-06 (“[I]t is difficult to see how a 3.5% [termination] 
fee would have deterred a rival bidder who wished to pay materially more for [the compa-
ny].”). Perhaps this is because stock prices randomly go up and down by this sort of margin 
all the time. See, e.g., Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 333 (discussing the argu-
ment that losing two to three percent of the company’s value “could hardly be deemed ‘coer-
cive’ because no shareholder” in voting or manager in deciding whether to make a competing 
bid “could measure the value of the merged entity with such precision”). 
 217. In re Comverge, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 7368-VCP, 2014 WL 6686570, at *15 (Del. 
Ch. Nov. 25, 2014) (thirteen percent when taken together with favorable conversion rate on 
notes issued to buyer); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., Nos. CIV.A. 17398, 
CIV.A. 17383, CIV.A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *2 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 1999) (6.3%). 
 218. E.g., In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 86 (Del. Ch. 2007) (a termination 
fee that was a bit high in percentage terms could be explained by the small size of the deal 
and that it included the buyer’s expenses). 
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provisions.219 In this instance, however, unlike Omnicare, the aggregating 
effect is a matter of degrees. This makes it difficult to say when such an 
effect will be too much. As one Chancery Court opinion put it, “[O]ne of 
these days some judge is going to say ‘no more’ and, when the drafting 
lawyer looks back, she will be challenged to figure out how or why the in-
cremental enhancement mattered. It will be yet another instance of the 
straw and the poor camel’s back.”220 
 The context provided by the background setting of the deal potentially 
includes: Why were the directors looking for a buyer? How much did the 
directors shop for competing bids before agreeing to the merger with the 
deal protections? What motive did the directors have for agreeing to the 
deal protections? How good was the deal? Also, subsequent events (the 
presence of parties actually interested in making a later competing bid) 
add to the context. 
 Judicial reactions to such background context seem to vary. In Revlon, 
such context was everything. By contrast, the court in Omnicare seemed 
unmoved by the desperate straits in which NCS found itself, which made 
a bird in the hand desirable even at the expense of completely foreclosing 
other more attractive offers. This may suggest a greater focus on context 
in Revlon situations with its emphasis on getting the best deal—
something that may depend, for example, as much on the extent directors 
shopped before agreeing to the merger as it does on the terms of the deal 
protection devices. By comparison, broader contextual issues regarding 
the deal have less to do with Omnicare’s expressed concern about protect-
ing the shareholders’ veto. Still, one wonders whether the decision in 
Omnicare would have been the same despite the fait accompli if there 
were no superior bid by Omnicare to create seller’s remorse. Indeed, one 
Chancery Court opinion has mused about whether the court should issue 
an injunction even when faced with deal protections violating Omnicare if 
there is no other bidder on the horizon.221 
6   Unocal Scrutiny of Shotgun Corporate Marriages Beyond Just  
Deal Protections 
 The court in Omnicare, citing Time, assumed that the business judg-
ment rule governed the decision to accept the Genesis proposal and con-
fined review under Unocal to agreeing to the deal protections.222 In Time, 
                                                                                                                                        
 219. See, e.g., La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Crawford, 918 A.2d 1172, 1180-81 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (deal protections formed an “intricate barricade” to another bidder). 
 220. In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL 1938253, at *8 
(Del. Ch. May 12, 2011). 
 221. In re OPENLANE, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *10 
n.53 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011). 
 222. Omnicare, Inc., v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 928-29 (Del. 2003). 
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the court upheld under the business judgment rule the original decision 
by Time’s board to merge with Warner and only applied Unocal (with one 
notable exception223) once the board, in response to Paramount’s offer, re-
structured the Warner merger into a cash deal to remove the need for a 
vote by Time’s shareholders.224 This, however, forces us to ask what exact-
ly it was about the restructuring by Time’s board that triggered Unocal. 
 One possibility is that Unocal applied simply because the restructur-
ing occurred in response to a hostile tender offer and Unocal applies to 
any board action taken for the purpose of interfering with a hostile tender 
offer. Following this line of reasoning, decisions to sell or merge (and not 
just the deal protection devices) for the purpose of interfering with hostile 
tender offers (a sort of corporate marriage of necessity so to speak) are 
subject to review under Unocal when not subject to Revlon. 
 An alternate possibility is that Unocal applied only because the re-
structuring removed the right of the shareholders to vote on the Time-
Warner deal, thereby taking away from Time’s shareholders the ultimate 
choice between marrying Warner or marrying Paramount. Under this 
analysis, decisions to sell or merge the corporation (rather than just 
agreeing to deal protection devices) do not trigger Unocal scrutiny, even if 
motivated as a response to a hostile tender offer, so long as the sharehold-
ers can vote down the deal.225 
 Yet, even if Unocal only applies to depriving shareholders of a vote, but 
not to the deal itself, this may still have considerable impact. In Time, the 
restructuring was reactive—hostile bid followed by restructuring to elim-
inate the vote requirement. Unocal scrutiny, however, is not limited to 
decisions following a hostile bid. Instead, preemptive actions, such as deal 
protection devices or takeover defenses, are subject to Unocal scrutiny 
despite being taken before any hostile bid.226 This creates the prospect 
that whenever boards choose to structure a corporate combination in a 
manner that does not require a shareholder vote, review of this decision 
demands scrutiny under Unocal. Indeed, this conclusion seems to follow 
given that Omnicare justified applying Unocal to deal protection devices 
based in substantial part on protecting the shareholders’ power to vote 
contrary to the board’s wishes, and the seeming equivalence between co-
                                                                                                                                        
 223. The court in Time applied Unocal to certain deal protection features in the original 
Time-Warner merger agreement. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 
1151 (Del. 1989). 
 224. Id. at 1152. 
 225. The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Williams provides support for this inter-
pretation in its application of the business judgment rule, rather than Unocal, to takeover 
defenses enacted through shareholder approved certificate amendments and its explanation 
that Unocal only applies to unilateral (as opposed to shareholder approved) defensive actions 
by the board. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996). 
 226. E.g., Strine, supra note 181, at 934. 
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ercing shareholders with deal protection devices and depriving the share-
holders of a vote altogether. 
 This, however, brings us back to the old debate over the de facto mer-
ger doctrine when it comes to shareholder rights. In Time, switching the 
consideration received by Warner’s shareholders to cash avoided a NYSE 
listing requirement to put large stock issuances to a shareholder vote. 
Yet, something quite different avoided any requirement under Delaware’s 
corporation statute for a vote by Time’s shareholders. By structuring the 
Time-Warner combination as a merger of Warner with a subsidiary of 
Time, rather than with Time itself, the “shareholder” on the Time side 
who needed to approve the merger under Delaware law was Time—
meaning that Time’s board cast the shareholder vote to approve the Time-
Warner merger.227 
 Courts in some jurisdictions have attempted to prevent use of deal 
structure to avoid triggering shareholder rights (such as voting or ap-
praisal rights) that normally attach to a merger by labeling such a trans-
action a de facto merger.228 The Delaware Supreme Court in Hariton v. 
ARCO Electronics, Inc.,229 rejected, however, any recognition of the de fac-
to merger doctrine when it comes to shareholder rights in Delaware. 
 Does Hariton preclude applying Unocal scrutiny to structuring corpo-
rate combinations in ways that avoid a shareholder vote (other than, as in 
Time, in reaction to a hostile tender offer)? Perhaps not, since such scru-
tiny would be consistent with a broader Delaware approach encapsulated 
within Unocal under which the Delaware Supreme Court interprets the 
corporation statute to grant broad authority to the board, but then applies 
more careful scrutiny to the use of such authority to reduce shareholder 
power in particular instances. This allows the court to take a flexible ap-
proach in using judicial review to carry out the goal of refereeing power 
disputes between the board and shareholders. 
IV.   WHAT’S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT SAYING YES? 
 The arcane standards in Delaware for reviewing board decisions to sell 
or merge the corporation suggest the utility of stepping back to take a 
wider view. Our objective is to identify precisely when and how, in light of 
the three goals for judicial review, board decisions to sell or merge the 
corporation raise greater or different concerns than exist for other board 
decisions, thereby calling for different standards. 
                                                                                                                                        
 227. Time, 571 A.2d at 1146. 
 228. E.g., In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litig., 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (involving a 
triangular merger); Pratt v. Ballman-Cummings Furniture Co., 495 S.W.2d 509 (Ark. 1973). 
But see Terry v. Penn Cent. Corp., 668 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 229. 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963). 
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A.   Dangers of Disloyalty 
1.   At the Buzzer 
 The principal argument that decisions to sell or merge the corporation 
inherently present a heightened danger of disloyalty invokes what econ-
omists refer to as a final period problem.230 Specifically, the incentives for 
doing a good job created by directors’ and senior executives’ desire to 
maintain or advance their positions within the corporation disappear if 
the directors and senior executives know that the sale or merger will lead 
to their removal. 
 This final period rationale is different in a fundamental way from the 
conflict of interest concerns that traditionally lead to increased scrutiny of 
board decisions. Conflicts of interest produce incentives that affirmatively 
encourage directors to act contrary to the corporation’s or the sharehold-
ers’ interests. So, in making a contract between a director and the corpo-
ration in which he or she is a director, the director has an incentive to give 
him or herself a good deal. Less extreme, but still similar, the normal 
human desire to retain power, not to mention whatever compensation or 
perquisites go with the position, give directors an incentive to oppose ten-
der offers that would remove them from their positions. By contrast, the 
final period argument, in itself, does not posit any incentive that affirma-
tively encourages directors and senior executives to sacrifice corporate or 
shareholder interests. Rather, the argument is that the directors and sen-
ior executives will not have as much incentive as they normally do to 
make the right decision for the corporation and its shareholders. 
 This distinction, in turn, forces one to ask whether decreased incen-
tives for good decisions justifies heightened judicial scrutiny of board deci-
sions to sell or merge the corporation based upon the goal of protecting 
against disloyal motives.231 The problem is that once courts begin adjust-
ing the level of scrutiny to offset decreased incentives directors may have 
in some situations, it is difficult to know where to stop. For example, the 
final period situation involving the sale or merger of a corporation is not 
the only final period situation, and, indeed, may not even be the most im-
portant final period situation. Businesses in trouble present a final period 
situation.232 Should heightened scrutiny, rather than the business judg-
ment rule, apply to every decision directors make for failing corporations? 
                                                                                                                                        
 230. E.g., Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 458-59 (Del. Ch. 2011); Sean 
J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 
1942 (2003). 
 231. Thinking ahead, the reader might also ask whether the loss of incentives in a final 
period situation demands added scrutiny under the goal of reducing unintended harm, even if 
it does not under the goal of protecting against disloyal decisions. To avoid duplication, the 
present discussion will serve for both. 
 232. E.g., Griffin, supra note 230, at 1943. 
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Moreover, the inevitability of aging presents each director with his or 
her own final period situation. The impact of Van Gorkom’s impend-
ing retirement on the events in the Van Gorkom case provides an ex-
ample of this.233 On the other hand, directors, who are not in the final 
stages of their career, may have plenty of incentive to do a good job in 
order to preserve their reputation in the broader market for their 
services even if they will never face another election by a particular 
corporation’s shareholders.234 Should the level of scrutiny depend on 
the average age of the board members? 
 Beyond this, compensation schemes and stock ownership create differ-
ent degrees of incentive toward good performance.235 Does this mean 
courts should apply a higher degree of scrutiny to a board decision if the 
directors do not own much stock in their corporation or do not receive 
compensation dependent upon corporate performance and so may have 
limited financial incentives for making good decisions? How about direc-
tors of non-profit corporations, who may not receive any compensation;236 
should their decisions be subject to stricter scrutiny because of less finan-
cial incentive to do a good job? 
 Such questions suggest pause before imposing added scrutiny on board 
decisions to sell or merge the corporation because of the loss of incentives 
in a final period situation. This is especially so since the final period ar-
gument as applied to directors in a corporation with widely dispersed 
ownership sounds better the less one thinks about it. After all, it has long 
been recognized that the need to answer to widely dispersed shareholders 
in a public company provides very little discipline upon corporate boards 
even before a final period occasioned by sale or merger.237 
 Some writers238 have attempted to tie the final period problem into 
more conventional disloyalty by raising the concern that directors and 
senior executives may respond to the final period involved in selling or 
merging the corporation by seeking to maintain their positions following 
the sale or merger and by making side deals with the buyer. However, it 
                                                                                                                                        
 233. Van Gorkom’s approaching retirement, combined with his substantial holding of 
Trans Union stock, may have motivated him to seek a sale, rather than worrying about get-
ting the top dollar. 
 234. E.g., Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative 
Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 BUS. LAW. 503, 526 
(1989). 
 235. E.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the De-
rivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 
261, 276 (1986). 
 236. E.g., Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Punctilios and Nonprofit Corporate 
Governance - A Comprehensive Look at Nonprofit Directors’ Fiduciary Duties, 14 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 347, 364 (2012). 
 237. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text. 
 238. E.g., Bainbridge, supra note 16, at 3291-92. 
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is distracting and over-inclusive to assume that every sale or merger in-
volves the danger of disloyal motives as a final period because some sales 
or mergers involve efforts to maintain positions or making side deals. 
2.   One Door Closes, Another Door Opens 
 As just seen, the real disloyalty problem from directors and senior ex-
ecutives potentially losing their positions as a result of selling or merging 
the corporation lies with efforts by directors and senior executives to as-
sure their continued positions after the sale or merger and to negotiate 
with the buyer over the terms of such employment or other sorts of com-
pensation. This disloyalty can manifest itself in two ways: Directors and 
senior executives may favor a transaction with a buyer who will continue 
them in their positions over a deal with a buyer who will not, or directors 
and senior executives in negotiating the transaction may trade a lower 
price for the company in exchange for a better package for themselves.239 
 It is important, however, to analyze when this danger is greater 
and when the danger is less when it comes to selling or merging a 
corporation. This starts by asking why, if directors and senior execu-
tives are worried about maintaining their positions, they decided to 
sell or merge the company. 
 Revlon involved one explanation: If the directors did not sell to the 
white knight, the shareholders were going to sell to a hostile bidder. 
Moreover, in times of industry consolidation, directors might not wait for 
a hostile bidder before seeking friendly partner. Still, sales or mergers of 
corporations take place all the time without the threat that if the directors 
do not sell or merge now, they will inevitably face a successful hostile offer 
later.240 This suggests that before assuming a danger of disloyal motives 
in any sale or merger in which directors or senior executives maintain 
their positions, one must ascertain the extent to which their positions 
were at risk without the sale or merger. 
 One caveat to this conclusion is that announcements of agreements to 
sell or merge the corporation often encourage other parties to make a 
higher bid.241 Directors, who have agreed to a transaction with a buyer 
                                                                                                                                        
 239. E.g., Jay C. Hartzell, et al., What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 
17 REV. FIN. STUD. 37, 51-56 (2004) (finding that management of selling corporations ex-
change lower premiums for generous compensation packages); Julie Wulf, Do CEOs in Mer-
gers Trade Power for Premium? Evidence from “Mergers of Equals,” 20 J.L. ECO. & ORG. 60, 
94 (2004) (finding that management of merging corporations exchange lower premiums for 
employment in the surviving entity). 
 240. See, e.g., Mark Lebovitch & Peter B. Morrison, Calling a Duck a Duck: Determining 
the Validity of Deal Protection Provisions in Merger of Equals Transactions, 2001 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 1, 27 (deal protections most often approved “ ‘on a clear day,’ when a third-party 
unsolicited bidder has yet to come forward”). 
 241. See, e.g., id at 28-29 (acquirers would not ask for deal protections if they did not fear 
later bids); Heath Price Tarbert, Merger Breakup Fees: A Critical Challenge to Anglo-
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that will keep them in their positions, might worry that such higher bids 
could come from buyers that will not. Hence, Unocal scrutiny of deal pro-
tection devices based upon entrenchment concerns seems reasonable 
when directors agree to a transaction with a buyer that will maintain cur-
rent management, even in situations in which there was no threat to cur-
rent management without a sale or merger. Still, much as Delaware 
courts have taken a fairly relaxed view under Unocal toward the mere 
adoption of a poison pill prior to a hostile offer,242 courts might reasonably 
be less rigorous in reviewing deal protections in the absence of an actual 
earlier or later bidder who threatens to replace the board. 
 More significantly, the importance of retaining positions to the appro-
priate level of scrutiny is a double-edged sword. In sales or mergers in 
which directors or senior executives do not retain their positions, this mo-
tive for potential disloyalty does not exist. Indeed, insofar as the tradi-
tional justification for heightened scrutiny under Unocal lies in the omni-
present specter that directors might be acting to preserve their positions, 
it becomes hard to justify applying Unocal to deal protections for sales or 
mergers in which the directors will lose their positions.243 
 Moreover, it is worth noting that sales or mergers in which directors 
and senior executives retain their positions commonly still leave the di-
rectors and senior executives in a worse situation than they were before. 
This is most evident in a sale of control, such as the Paramount-Viacom 
merger condemned in QVC. 
 At least since Berle and Means,244 it has been understood that share-
holders of companies with widely dispersed ownership do not really select 
or control the directors.245 A sale of control, such as the proposed Para-
mount-Viacom merger, changes this dynamic, since senior executives and 
directors are now answerable to a single shareholder with the real ability 
to exercise control.246 Indeed, they may find themselves sharing the often-
unhappy lot of managers of professional sports teams who must keep the 
teams’ owners happy. By contrast, a merger that leaves control among 
widely dispersed shareholders, such as the Time-Warner combination, 
                                                                                                                                        
American Corporate Law, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 627, 631 (2003) (deal jumping by mak-
ing a higher bid between the time of the merger agreement and the time of shareholder ap-
proval sharply increased in the mid-1990s). 
 242. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 243. For a brief discussion of a case in which the defendant directors, in fact, argued that 
the court should apply a deferential standard of review to a sale in which none of the board 
would maintain their positions after the sale, see Strine, supra note 181, at 931 n.35. 
 244. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
 245. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 
675, 679 (2007). 
 246. E.g., Gilson, supra note 30, at 1650-51. 
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keeps the Berle-Means dynamic for the directors and senior executives 
who retain their positions following the transaction. This is why the re-
sults in Time and QVC produce a paradox and the Revlon doctrine as 
transmitted through QVC is entirely upside-down. Indeed, to the extent 
that scrutiny of decisions to sell or of deal protections in Revlon situations 
should differ from scrutiny under Unocal as applied to so-called mergers 
of equals or efforts to remain independent, the standard applied to Revlon 
situations should be less demanding, not more. 
 Beyond the concern that directors and senior executives may favor a 
buyer who will retain them in their positions, there is the concern that, in 
negotiating with the buyer, directors and senior executives may trade a 
lower price for the company in exchange for a better employment package 
or other sorts of side payments for themselves. This means that courts 
have appropriately increased scrutiny of agreements to sell or merge the 
company negotiated along with employment or other contracts for the 
directors and senior executives.247 
 The court can also deter selling out the shareholders when negotiating 
side deals by applying the rule that an agent must fork over to the princi-
pal any benefits the agent receives from parties with whom the agent is 
negotiating on behalf of the principal absent approval of the agent’s con-
duct by a fully informed principal.248 Applied here, the senior executives 
or directors should give to their former shareholders any even arguably 
above-market compensation they receive from the buyer whenever there 
is simultaneous negotiation of the sale and any personal contracts, unless 
independent directors or shareholders have voted specifically to approve 
the simultaneous negotiation after full disclosure.249 
 Still, one might worry that the danger of side deals goes beyond 
simultaneous negotiation of the sale or merger and of the terms of 
employment or other arrangements. Specifically, directors and senior 
executives might try to curry favor with the prospective buyer in the 
hope that the buyer will remember kindly what they did when later 
setting the terms of their new employment package or in other ways. 
Such conduct is obviously much more difficult to detect and police. 
Nevertheless, there are other incentives to consider. For example, 
managers might think twice before beginning their relationship with 
                                                                                                                                        
 247. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. Extensive securities law disclosure re-
quirements should make it difficult to keep such deals a secret in the sale or merger of a pub-
licly held corporation. E.g., Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 24, at 1786. 
 248. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2016). 
 249. In this regard, it is important to recognize that approving the sale or merger is not 
the same as approving the simultaneous negotiation, and disinterested directors or share-
holders should not be forced to approve of the practice of simultaneous negotiations as the 
price for getting a deal that they do not wish to turn down. 
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their new boss by taking actions that will give their new boss 
grounds to suspect their future trustworthiness.250 
3.   Being Human 
 Judges and commentators, who assert that the final period prob-
lem creates a risk of disloyalty extending beyond efforts to maintain 
positions or making side deals with the buyer, worry that directors 
and senior executives will give in to all sorts of motives when selling 
or merging the corporation.251 As evidence, they often recite the 
amusing tale of personal pique motivating the key players in the 
Revlon drama252 or similar stories. 
 No doubt such tales may paint a far more realistic picture of selling 
or merging the corporation than the sterile models of rational wealth 
maximizing, deal-making often used as the basis for normative discus-
sions. Still, to suggest that such very human behavior only infects de-
cisions to sell or merge the corporation and is restrained before a final 
period, is to show that one does not get out very much.253 Just read the 
Disney case,254 or better yet, read the more journalistic descriptions of 
the events surrounding Michael Ovitz’ hiring and firing by Michael 
Eisner.255 As suggested by this example—not to mention any experi-
ence on hiring or tenure committees—personnel decisions are particu-
larly susceptible to emotional reactions.256 Should courts start applying 
                                                                                                                                        
 250. E.g., Fraidin & Hanson, supra note 24, at 1811. 
 251. E.g., In re El Paso Corp. S’holder Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 439 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“[A] range 
of human motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can inspire fiduciaries and 
their advisors to be less than faithful to their contextual duty to pursue the best value for the 
company’s stockholders.”); Griffith, supra note 230, at 1947 (“Directors and managers may 
favor one deal over another because it is more in line with their self image and view of the 
world or because it is more likely to cause them to be remembered fondly by employees or the 
business press.”). 
 252. E.g., El Paso, 41 A.3d at 439 n.24 (“Revlon’s CEO, Michel Bergerac, rebuffed Pantry 
Pride’s acquisition overtures in part because of the ‘strong personal antipathy’ felt by Berge-
rac towards Pantry Pride’s CEO, Ron Perelman, who was an upstart from Philly and not  
someone . . . Bergerac wanted running his storied company.”). 
 253. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that the 
business judgment rule is based on the recognition that all director decisions involve some 
personal interest, but it would be impractical to take this into account). 
 254. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d 906 A.2d 
27 (Del. 2006). 
 255. E.g., Kurt Andersen, Ovitz and Eisner: A Kids’ Story, N.Y. MAG., http://nymag.com/ 
nymetro/news/columns/imperialcity/10900/ [https://perma.cc/T8GT-LJWZ] (“The Eisner-Ovitz 
debacle resulted from the sort of emotional, irrational mischief ordinarily made by children.”). 
 256. This is not to say that only personnel decisions exhibit such tendencies. One can see 
an example of such very human decision-making in the long-time refusal by the majority 
owner of the corporation operating the Chicago Cubs to have the company install lights in 
Wrigley Field based upon his view that baseball is a daytime sport. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 
N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
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heightened scrutiny to selection of senior corporate executives? If not, 
it is difficult to see this as justification for heightened scrutiny of deci-
sions to sell or merge the corporation. 
4.   The Other Guys 
 Discussions of the final period problem, of retaining positions and 
making side deals, and of acting on emotions, often point to examples in-
volving senior executives. The directors, however, made the challenged 
decision to sell or merge the corporation. Suspect motives by persons who 
are not directors do not, without more, justify heightened scrutiny of the 
board’s decision. 
 The easiest case for imposing heightened scrutiny over a board deci-
sion based upon conflicts of interest for persons other than the directors 
occurs with transactions with controlling shareholders (freeze-outs). By 
definition, controlling shareholders control the directors, thereby turning 
the controlling shareholders’ conflicts into the directors’ conflicts. 
 Conflicting motives of senior executives (for example, the CEO) are 
trickier. The senior executives might also be directors—albeit, it would be 
rare in a public corporation in this day and age for senior executives to 
occupy the entire or even most of the board.257 A realistic assessment of 
board dynamics commonly shows, however, the influence possessed by 
executives, and especially the CEO, over outside directors.258 
 Still, belief in the ability of disinterested (or at least independent) di-
rectors to protect the corporation from executive conflicts reigns as a cen-
tral tenet of corporate law. Statutory provisions allowing the vote of disin-
terested directors to cure conflicts of interest by directors or officers259 re-
flect this belief. Indeed, the most dramatic conflict of interest transaction 
involving corporate executives, the setting of their compensation, general-
ly falls within the business judgment rule by virtue of disinterested direc-
tor approval.260 Hence, if one wishes to challenge the notion that non-
executive directors can protect the corporation and shareholders from the 
conflicts of senior executives, decisions to sell the corporation are hardly 
the only area demanding heightened scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                                        
 257. See, e.g., N.Y.S.E. Manual 303A.01, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/sections/lcm-
sections/chp_1_4/default.asp [https://perma.cc/XDH3-T7K8?type=image] (listed companies 
must have a majority of independent directors). 
 258. E.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 26-34 (2004) (discussing various ways 
in which CEOs possess influence over directors). 
 259. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2016). 
 260. E.g., Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979). 
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B.   Reducing Unintended Harm 
 Having seen that arguments for heightened scrutiny based upon con-
cerns over disloyalty only justify special treatment of decisions to sell or 
merge in much narrower contexts than currently done, we now arrive at 
the goal of reducing unintended harm. In this instance, the factors that 
might lead courts to impose greater than normal scrutiny on decisions to 
sell or merge are often unarticulated, and, indeed, may operate on an al-
most subconscious level. Hence, we must bring these factors to the surface 
and then ask whether they, or other more articulated factors, justify de-
parting from the minimalist approach to this goal normally followed in 
corporate law. 
1.   Making a Big Deal of Big Deals 
 Perhaps the most obvious fact about a decision to sell or merge the 
corporation is its significance—indeed, one might argue that it will often 
be the most important decision that a board will ever make. From this 
observation, courts might draw the common sense conclusion that boards 
should engage in more investigation and deliberation in deciding to sell or 
merge the company than boards do in more mundane matters (say, de-
claring a dividend or recommending a vote against a shareholder proposal 
appearing on the company’s proxy form). 
 Yet, we must ask not just how directors respond to more important 
board decisions, but also how do judges. Here we confront the prospect 
that the greater significance of a board’s decision may cause a court to pay 
more attention to challenges to that decision and thus (often unwittingly) 
produce a degree of scrutiny—either in nominally applying the business 
judgment rule or in deciding to depart from that rule—which is incon-
sistent with the approach of courts in more ordinary contexts. 
 To understand the phenomenon, consider the likely reaction of a judge 
to a complaint that directors breached their duty of care in making some 
fairly ordinary business decisions—such as refusing to install lights in a 
baseball stadium,261 blowing some tax savings by declaring an in-kind 
dividend,262 or operating a supermarket chain in a manner that the re-
tired CEO thinks ill-advised.263 Challenges to such matters highlight that 
the judge is being asked to get involved in the ongoing running of a busi-
ness and create a concern that anything more than a back-of-the-hand 
dismissal could lead to an avalanche of similar litigation. Besides, the 
judge might view the plaintiff in such cases as a bit of a crank. By con-
trast, a challenge to a mega corporate transaction is likely to make a 
                                                                                                                                        
 261. See Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d 776. 
 262. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
 263. See Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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judge sit up and take notice and thus, get a more serious look—especially 
when a more substantial party (such as a disappointed bidder) with more 
capable attorneys brings the challenge. As the court takes a more serious 
look, the inevitable blemishes in the deal and the process leading up to it 
begin to show, which, in turn, provokes greater examination and ulti-
mately a different degree of scrutiny than applied to challenges to an or-
dinary business decision. 
 Naturally, it might be a bit tacky, and raise questions about equal 
access to justice, for courts to come out and state that they will apply 
greater scrutiny to more significant corporate transactions. Still, one 
can get a hint of this in the explanation for heightened scrutiny in the 
QVC decision. Specifically, in holding that shifting control to a single 
person triggered Revlon—thereby dramatically expanding the circum-
stances under which Delaware courts explicitly give increased scrutiny 
to decisions to sell or merge—the court expressed concern about the 
loss of effective voting power for the unaffiliated shareholders once a 
single individual owns a majority of a corporation’s outstanding voting 
stock, and explained that the transaction, in essence, involved the sale 
of a valuable asset belonging to the public shareholders (the ability to 
obtain a premium price for selling control over the corporation).264 
These concerns, however, simply demonstrate that the decision is an 
important one to the shareholders.265 If the court had pointed to such 
concerns as mandating careful investigation and deliberation by the 
directors, this would have been unexceptional. But this is not what the 
court said. It said that such concerns—in other words, the importance 
of the deal—mandated enhanced scrutiny by the court. 
 Of course, one might argue that greater scrutiny of more consequential 
decisions makes a certain amount of sense as a matter of efficient use of 
judicial resources. Yet, among the lexicon of arguments asserted in sup-
port of deference to board decisions under the business judgment rule,266 
judicial economy has rarely, if ever, been one of them. Put differently, 
none of the rationales for deference under the business judgment rule—
such as the concern about deterring necessary risk taking in business or 
the greater business expertise of directors versus judges—apply less to big 
decisions than to small ones. 
 Even, however, if one believes that more important board decisions 
warrant greater judicial scrutiny, the assumption that deciding to sell or 
merge the corporation is more important than other board decisions is at 
                                                                                                                                        
 264. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42-43 (Del. 1993). 
 265. Id. at 43 (“Because of the intended sale of control, the Paramount–Viacom transac-
tion has economic consequences of considerable significance to the Paramount stockholders.”). 
 266. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 20, at 305-20 (discussing the rationales for the busi-
ness judgment rule). 
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best a very crude and commonly inaccurate approximation. To see why, 
compare two cases: Van Gorkom and the shareholder derivative suit 
against the directors of the government-rescued bank in In re Citigroup 
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation.267 Perhaps if Trans Union’s board 
had been more careful in Van Gorkom the shareholders would have got-
ten a better deal—maybe $60 as opposed to $55 per share.268 During a 
corporation’s history, directors will make many decisions that have far 
more impact over the long haul than ten percent of the value of the 
stock.269 By comparison, the board’s allowing Citigroup’s operation in 
CDOs during the mid-2000s cost Citigroup billions of dollars in losses 
when the mortgage market went bust, which, in turn, necessitated a gov-
ernment bailout to save Citigroup and drove once pricy stock to pea-
nuts.270 Indeed, for courts to give more careful scrutiny to claims that di-
rectors failed to get every last cent in selling or merging the company 
than courts do in cases in which directors preside over corporate ruin 
seems upside down if judicial economy is the criteria. 
2.   A Locus for Focus 
 The comparison between the Van Gorkom and Citigroup cases sug-
gests another factor that may prompt unconsciously greater judicial scru-
tiny of board decisions to sell or merge the company. Such decisions ulti-
mately entail a binary choice by the corporation’s board upon which to 
focus the review. While slightly complicated by a couple of later meetings 
in which the board reaffirmed its earlier decision, Van Gorkom is ulti-
mately all about a two-hour meeting at which the board decided to sell 
the company for $55 per share. We know what process the board followed 
and what decision it made, and the responsibility lay entirely with the 
board. By contrast, the misadventures with CDOs at the heart of the 
Citigroup derivative litigation involved a series of decisions and non-
decisions—e.g., getting involved with putting together CDOs to begin 
                                                                                                                                        
 267. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 268. Sixty dollars per share was the high-end estimate of the price for an LBO that Trans 
Union’s cash flow would support. 
 269. See, e.g., Ryan Derousseau, The Four Horseman of Bad Decision Making, 
FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2015, 1:04 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/09/28/bad-ceo-decisions/ 
[http://perma.cc/R58D-M7RM] (discussing causes and examples of bad decisions by CEOs 
picked by boards, including VW’s CEO’s actions in emissions scandal, which resulted in 
a forty percent drop in the price of VW stock); Diana Samuels, Bad Boards Breed  
Bad Decisions, SILICON VALLEY BUS. J. (May 18, 2012, 3:00 AM), http:// 
www.bizjournals.com/sanjose/print-edition/2012/05/18/bad-boards-breed-bad-decisions.html 
(discussing causes and examples of poor board decisions particularly with respect to CEO 
turnover, with significant consequences for the corporations involved). 
 270. E.g., Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, The Reckoning: Citigroup Saw No Red Flags 
Even as It Made Bolder Bets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/11/23/business/23citi.html [https://perma.cc/8PDH-2EJD]. 
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with, expanding the CDO operation, not curtailing the CDO operation in 
the face of signs of weakness in the market for subprime mortgages, plac-
ing risky terms for the issuer (liquidity puts) in the CDOs, financing the 
CDO operation with short-term money through special investment vehi-
cles—made by Citigroup executives at various levels and acquiesced in by 
the board or committees of the board over time.271 In the former case, it is 
relatively easy for a court to second guess exactly what the board should 
have done differently; in the latter case, stating exactly which directors 
should have done what differently, and when, is less straightforward.272 
As a result, board decisions to sell or merge present a much more inviting 
target for scrutiny and second-guessing. 
 The irony, however, is that insofar as one purpose of the business 
judgment rule is to allow the board to make decisions free from the fear of 
judicial second-guessing,273 the single binary board decision needs at least 
as much, if not more, protection from excessive after-the-fact scrutiny as 
does the board’s more general exercise of its oversight role. 
3.   Routinized and Scrutinized 
 In explaining why directors are protected by the business judgment 
rule while doctors are not, Melvin Eisenberg once argued274 that there are 
protocols for medical decisions against which to measure the doctor’s con-
duct, which is not the case for decisions by the board. This suggests that if 
courts come to view certain board decisions to be subject to accepted pro-
tocols or routines, courts will be more willing to carefully scrutinize devia-
tions from such routines. In fact, this might be going on in Delaware cases 
reviewing board decisions to sell or merge the company. 
 Earlier, this article discussed the continued efforts by the Delaware 
Chancery Court to impose certain processes—market checks in the ab-
sence of impeccable board knowledge—upon board decisions governed by 
Revlon.275 Why is this occurring? In fact, this potentially illustrates a spi-
ral, in which greater scrutinization of activities by courts leads to greater 
routinization by parties, which, in turn, leads to greater scrutinization  
by courts. 
                                                                                                                                        
 271. E.g., id.; Gevurtz, supra note 33, at 115-20. 
 272. Indeed, one is reminded of Judge Hand’s discussion of the impossibility of proving 
that the defendant director’s neglect caused the failure of the business in Barnes v. Andrews, 
298 F. 614, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
 273. E.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 274. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 
U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 963-64 (1990). 
 275. See supra notes 118-28 and accompanying text. 
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 The spiral begins276 in court opinions that seek to explain what stands 
condemned and, particularly in Delaware, provide advice on what is ac-
ceptable.277 Two groups of attorneys use such language to influence the 
conduct of directors. The first group consists of attorneys who advise 
boards. Their job is to urge directors to act in a manner blessed in prior 
court decisions and avoid any actions that a prior court decision even 
hints might have raised concern.278 The second group consists of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys who challenge board decisions to sell. Their job is to pounce on 
any deviation from actions clearly blessed in prior court decisions and any 
actions that vaguely resemble actions criticized in prior court decisions. 
 As the actions of these two groups of lawyers herd directors into de-
fined channels of carrying out their duties, the resulting consistency of 
board conduct, in turn, can influence court opinions. The ability to com-
pare the case at hand against normal protocols followed by corporate 
boards gives the court the confidence to overcome the lack of expertise 
rationale for deference under the business judgment rule.279 Indeed, the 
much-ballyhooed business expertise of Delaware judges,280 reinforced by 
frequent merger litigation, can actually work to decrease deference by 
giving the judges confidence in reviewing board decisions to sell or merge. 
 Perhaps moving away from deference when boards deviate from ac-
cepted protocols for investigation and deliberation is a good thing. Few 
airline passengers would vote to have pilots abandon pre-flight checklists, 
and adherence to protocols by health care professionals can reduce the 
incidence of harmful medical errors.281 Yet, one must be aware of the po-
tentially broad impact of accepting this view for decisions to sell or merge 
the company. 
 To begin with, while scrutinizing deviations from protocols for deliber-
ation and investigation, as opposed to scrutinizing the substantive merits 
of the decision, might seem relatively harmless, it may be a shorter jump 
than one thinks to go from protocols dealing with process to protocols 
                                                                                                                                        
 276. The reader might wonder whether this discussion has put the chicken before  
the egg. 
 277. See, e.g., Mohsen Manesh, Damning Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in Dela-
ware, 39 J. CORP. L. 35, 57 (2013) (discussing use of dictum in Delaware court opinions 
to provide guidance). 
 278. E.g., Hamermesh & Fedechko, supra note 200, at 2 (“[B]y identifying certain con-
duct as desirable and tending to reduce the threat of liability, or vice versa, judicial opin-
ions encourage transactional advisors to shape their clients’ behavior in accordance with 
that identification.”). 
 279. See supra note 27. 
 280. E.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Why Delaware LLCs?, 91 OR. L. REV. 57, 108 (2012) 
(business sophistication of Delaware judges given as a rationale for selecting Delaware as the 
state in which to form LLCs). 
 281. E.g., Clement J. McDonald, Protocol-Based Computer Reminders, the Quality of 
Care and the Non-Perfectibility of Man, 295 N. ENG. J. MED. 1351 (1976). 
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dealing with substance. For example, at the heart of any decision to sell or 
merge is valuation. Should courts carefully scrutinize deviations from the 
norm by boards when it comes to approaches used for valuation?282 
 Moreover, decisions to sell or merge the company might not be the only 
board decisions in which routinization could lead to greater scrutiny and 
greater scrutiny could lead to greater routinization. This, in fact, returns 
us to the issue in the classic Wrigley case:283 If all major league baseball 
teams but one play night games under lights, should the court scrutinize 
the decision of the directors in charge of the corporation operating that 
team not to install lights in its stadium? 
4.   Mid-course Corrections 
 As discussed earlier,284 the Delaware Supreme Court, in its recent 
Corwin decision, suggested that heightened scrutiny under Revlon and 
Unocal is designed for injunction actions providing real time relief, while 
greater deference under the business judgment rule285 should govern 
damage actions. The underlying notion apparently is that courts can be 
more liberal in intervening in board decisions when there is the oppor-
tunity by quick action to get it right, without the chilling effect or other 
negative consequences that can follow from imposing liability for damages 
based upon twenty-twenty hindsight.286 
 Whatever the merits of this distinction—a topic that depends upon 
which of the rationales for the business judgment rule one finds persua-
sive287—there is no reason to confine the distinction to decisions to sell or 
merge the corporation. If injunction actions allow for more scrutiny of de-
cisions to sell or merge than allowed by the business judgment rule for 
damage actions arising from such sales or mergers, then injunction ac-
tions to force a corporate board to install lights in the baseball stadium 
                                                                                                                                        
 282. In fact, as discussed earlier, among possible readings of the Revlon doctrine is an 
obligation to pay greater attention to market valuation; moreover, the QVC opinion states 
that directors in Revlon situations should normally determine the value of non-cash consider-
ation paid for the company with the assistance of experts using generally accepted methods of 
valuation. Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 n.14. (Del. 1993). 
 283. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
 284. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 285. Or no liability absent bad faith if a Section 102(b)(7) waiver is present. 
 286. Allen et al., supra note 27, at 1297 n.30. 
 287. Specifically, is the purpose of the business judgment rule to prevent the chilling of 
useful risk taking that fear of personal liability might otherwise create or is the purpose for 
the business judgment rule based upon comparative expertise of directors versus courts—
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seeking damages? 
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operated by the corporation,288 or to prevent corporate expansion and de-
clare a dividend,289 similarly allow for greater scrutiny. 
5.   Win Some, Lose Some 
 The factors discussed so far might cause courts to exercise greater 
scrutiny of decisions to sell or merge the corporation than done for other 
board decisions. Some commentators,290 however, have made an argu-
ment that might justify courts exercising less scrutiny of decisions to sell 
or merge than courts exercise over other decisions. 
 The argument stems from the observation that shareholders common-
ly own a portfolio of stocks and, hence, shareholders in the selling corpo-
ration might also own stock in the purchaser, at least in cases in which 
the purchaser is a public, rather than privately held, corporation. As a 
result, what the selling corporation’s shareholders lose with a worse price, 
they might gain with a better price for the buyer. Of course, not all the 
selling company’s shareholders will own stock in the buyer and the pro-
portionate ownership of those who do may not be the same. Perhaps the 
seller’s shareholders might purchase stock in a publicly held buyer with 
the cash they receive in a cash sale (and, of course, will get stock in the 
buyer in a stock-for-stock deal). Yet, this hardly removes the loss from less 
cash or a lower exchange ratio of stock in the deal—otherwise why bother 
to negotiate such things. In any event, this is not the only deal that may 
affect the shareholders. In some future deal, the shareholders who are 
now complaining about a low price might only own shares, or own more 
shares, in the buyer and so, over the long run, better deals for publicly 
held buyers might offset the worse deals for sellers in terms of impact on 
the selling corporation’s shareholders’ overall portfolios. Moreover, lower 
prices for buyers might lead to more purchases of corporations, giving the 
selling corporation’s shareholders a greater chance of another premium 
price sale of shares they own in another corporation.291 
 Accepting a blasé view of board decisions to sell the corporation 
based upon this sort of portfolio approach to shareholder interest 
would radically rewrite directors’ duties in ways reaching far beyond 
decisions to sell or merge the corporation. To begin with, as many 
advocates of a stakeholder approach to directors’ duties like to point 
out,292 acceptance of a view of shareholder interests that goes beyond 
                                                                                                                                        
 288. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 776 (seeking injunction). 
 289. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (seeking injunction). 
 290. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 10, at 34-35, 59. 
 291. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1176-80 (1981). 
 292. E.g., JAMES E. POST, LEE E. PRESTON & SYBILLE SACHS, REDEFINING THE 
CORPORATION: STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH 51-56 (2002). 
2017]  SAYING YES 497 
  
the interest as shareholders in the corporation at hand undercuts a 
shareholder primacy or shareholder wealth maximization norm as 
the goal against which to measure directors’ conduct. 
 Revlon provides an illustration. The narrow holding of Revlon is that 
the directors breached their duty by accepting a bid in order to protect the 
holders of Revlon promissory notes instead of getting the most money for 
the shareholders. Revlon, however, had issued the promissory notes to its 
own shareholders in payment for a pro-rata purchase of just some of each 
of their shares in a hugely oversubscribed self-tender—meaning that pro-
tecting the noteholders was protecting another investment of potentially 
many Revlon shareholders. Moreover, even those Revlon shareholders 
who did not hold the notes might benefit if directors can accept lower 
price bids for a company when those bids better protect corporate credi-
tors. After all, Revlon shareholders might hold corporate debt issued by 
other companies. Also, perhaps other corporations in which the Revlon 
shareholders own stock could obtain loans on better terms in the future if 
directors look out for creditors when selling the company.293 Hence, a view 
of shareholder interests that goes beyond the interest as shareholders in 
the corporation at hand makes the Revlon decision wrong. 
 Beyond this, the sale of a corporation is not the only situation in which 
shareholders may have invested in companies in which what is bad for 
one is good for another.294 The most dramatic example would be share-
holders who have invested in companies that compete with each other. 
Indeed, such shareholders might assert that advertising and any other 
expenditures aimed at building market share at the expense of a compa-
ny’s publicly held competitors constitutes waste as actions serving no le-
gitimate purpose, because such actions do not advance the shareholders’ 
interest when considering the shareholders’ total portfolios. 
6.   Cannot Pull the Dodge Dodge 
 Discussion of the role of the noteholders in Revlon points to one 
way in which decisions to sell the corporation for cash are different 
than other decisions by the board: It is no longer possible for courts to 
avoid the question of whether directors can sacrifice profit for the 
shareholders to look out for employees, creditors, consumers, the 
community, or so on in the manner in which courts have ever since 
                                                                                                                                        
 293. Indeed, Lynn Stout and Margaret Blair’s team production theory would support an 
argument that shareholders with diversified portfolios of corporate stocks could prefer to take 
actions sacrificing maximum value in mergers and sales in order to protect the interests of 
workers, as this would promote firm-specific investments of human capital in other ventures 
in which the shareholders own, or might in the future own, stock. See Blair & Stout, supra 
note 39. 
 294. In fact, such diversification of risk is the idea behind investing in a portfolio of 
stocks. 
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the famous Dodge case.295 There, the court, after lecturing Henry 
Ford on how the directors breach their duty if they act to change the 
end objective of the corporation from profiting the shareholders to 
seeking to benefit others, actually allowed Ford to forgo obedience to 
maximizing shareholder profits on the off chance that the sharehold-
ers might end up better off in the long run by Ford’s plans anyway.296 
When the shareholders are cashed out, there is no such long run.297 
 Considerable debate exists over whether the law should require di-
rectors to focus on shareholder wealth maximization, or allow directors 
to balance the interests of competing stakeholders in the corpora-
tion.298 Weighing into this debate is beyond the scope of this Article. 
For those who would allow directors to balance the interests of compet-
ing stakeholders, decisions to sell the company call for no different 
scrutiny in this regard than any other board decision. For those de-
manding adherence to the primacy of shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion, the business judgment rule no longer affords the directors discre-
tion to balance the interests of shareholders versus employees, credi-
tors, consumers, and the community at large when, as in Revlon, the 
shareholders are cashing out and so it becomes impossible to rational-
ize how, in the long run, looking out for other stakeholders also looks 
out for the shareholders. In one sense, this is stricter scrutiny, since 
directors lose the discretion they possess in other contexts to balance 
interests between shareholders and other stakeholders. In another 
sense, however, it is not changing the level of scrutiny from the busi-
ness judgment rule. After all, the reason that courts in cases like 
Dodge conjure up the prospect of possible long run benefit to the 
shareholders is that the business judgment rule does not protect deci-
sions that self-evidently cannot possibly profit the shareholders re-
gardless of motivations.299 
                                                                                                                                        
 295. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 296. Id. at 507-08. While it is true that the court ordered Ford to declare a dividend, this 
was only because the company had the money to both pay the dividend and pursue Ford’s 
socially motivated expansion plans—which the court refused to enjoin. 
 297. Admittedly, the expression that there is no long run for cashed out shareholders is a 
bit of an exaggeration. If the buyer is publicly traded, the seller’s shareholders could purchase 
shares in the buyer with the cash they received. Still, there is no way to rationalize paying 
less cash to the seller’s shareholders as being in their long-range interest on the ground they 
can purchase stock in the buyer. The lower the price paid by the buyer, the greater the value 
of the buyer’s outstanding shares and so the seller’s shareholders will pay more to acquire 
equivalent stock in the buyer than the amount of cash they received in the sale. 
 298. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 299. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (business judgment rule does 
not protect a decision that lacks a business purpose or constitutes a no-win situation). 
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C.   Guarding the Shareholders’ Veto Power 
 Having found that the nature of board decisions to sell or merge can 
tempt courts toward applying greater scrutiny to reduce unintended 
harm, but fails to justify such treatment, we now arrive at the goal of ref-
ereeing between the board and shareholders when it comes to the exercise 
of decision-making power. In this instance, there is a clear difference be-
tween decisions to sell or merge and most other board decisions: Corpora-
tion statutes ordinarily require approval by the shareholders of decisions 
to merge or to sell substantially all of the company’s assets, which is not 
the case for most other decisions by the board.300 The problem lies in turn-
ing this difference into a standard for judicial review consistent with the 
goal one is trying to achieve. 
1.   Opening Skirmishes 
 Regardless of the standard of review employed, courts must begin by 
asking how, if at all, did the board’s action reduce the shareholders’ power 
to veto a merger or sale favored by the board. For example, as pointed out 
earlier,301 the deal protections in Omnicare did not actually reduce the 
power of the shareholders; indeed, as we shall see, the situations in which 
board actions materially impact the shareholders’ veto power is a rather 
confined set. If the board’s action does not interfere with the shareholders’ 
power, then there is no reason for additional scrutiny based upon the goal 
of policing the allocation of power between board and shareholders. 
 Finding that the board’s action in some manner reduced the effective-
ness of the shareholders’ veto power is not enough, however, to condemn 
the action. Otherwise, a shareholder lawsuit might demand that the di-
rectors fly all the shareholders to Maui for a several day retreat during 
which the shareholders hear presentations in favor and opposed to the 
proposed merger—all the better to create a more engaged and better in-
formed shareholder electorate. Hence, we must ask by what standard 
should courts determine whether a board decision is acceptable despite in 
some manner reducing the effectiveness of the shareholders’ power. 
 Before running off the rails, the court in Omnicare displayed reasona-
ble instincts in calling for higher scrutiny than just deference to the board 
under the business judgment rule when dealing with power clashes be-
tween the board and shareholders. After all, why should the court a priori 
favor one side over the other in a dispute over power—as opposed to a 
dispute over the merits where the board can invoke its greater expertise 
and the deference due from its unquestioned power? 
                                                                                                                                        
 300. E.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 41, § 3.1.3a (discussing distinction between decisions 
requiring shareholder approval and those left solely to the board). 
 301. See supra discussion accompanying note 161. 
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 Stripped to its core, Unocal imposes a standard of reasonableness.302 
This provides a workable beginning of an alternate framework to the 
business judgment rule for evaluating board actions impinging in some 
manner on the shareholders’ right to veto corporate mergers and sales; 
after all, what could be more reasonable than demanding that the board 
be reasonable.303 More seriously, reasonableness embodies the idea of an 
even-handed test that does not (for reasons just discussed) defer to the 
board, but, at the same time, does not put a thumb on the scale in favor 
shareholder claims—as appropriate to the goal of mediating power dis-
putes. Besides, more important than the general rubric is the specific con-
tent. Indeed, Omnicare, Time, and a number of other Delaware court 
opinions demonstrate the need to carefully develop an analytical frame-
work for deciding what is reasonable in this context. 
2.   Right Makes Might 
 An inherent danger in using a contextual tool like fiduciary duty or a 
standard like reasonableness as the vehicle for policing board efforts to 
reduce the shareholders’ power lies in the potential for the substantive 
merits of the decision to influence the question of who had the power to 
make it. Seller’s remorse, as in Omnicare, might tempt the finding that 
the board impermissibly usurped the shareholders’ veto power; while 
good deals with no better offers might tempt courts to turn a blind eye to 
a little arm twisting. 
 Perhaps one might argue that judicial review of the deal’s merits is the 
appropriate standard to apply in response to claims of board impingement 
of the shareholders’ right to veto mergers and sales. Beyond just extreme 
pragmatism, the basis for this argument is a notion of functional substi-
tutes. Specifically, if the purpose of shareholder approval is to serve as a 
double check on the wisdom of the board’s action, then careful review of 
the deal’s merits by the court could achieve the same objective. The struc-
ture of statutory provisions dealing with director conflict of interest 
                                                                                                                                        
 302. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 27, at 1309-10, 1319-20 (discussing Unocal/Unitrin 
intermediate reasonableness review). 
 303. One might argue for an even higher level of scrutiny when dealing with challenges 
to shareholder voting power. The fairness standard, however, looking as it does to whether a 
business transaction is a good deal for the corporation or shareholders, is irrelevant to power 
disputes. Courts in Delaware require a “compelling justification” when reviewing actions by 
directors that interfere with proxy contests (e.g., Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 
651 (Del. Ch. 1988)), which is more relevant. Yet, there is a danger in adopting a standard so 
demanding that once invoked, it determines the outcome regardless of the specific facts. This 
might lead courts to use the issue of whether the standard governs the situation at hand as 
an escape valve for applying a more flexible review. The result is to convert the nominal 
standard into simply a conclusion invoked after the court has reviewed the challenged action 
under a standard that the court never articulates. Some Delaware judges have observed that 
this seems to have happened to the Blasius compelling justification standard. Allen et al., 
supra note 27, at 1313. 
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transactions lends some support to this argument.304 Such provisions al-
low either a vote by shareholders or a judicial finding of fairness to cure 
the conflict. 
 This assumes, however, that the purpose for shareholder approval of 
mergers and sales is just to get a second opinion. While this is the objec-
tive when dealing with transactions in which directors or officers have a 
conflict of interest,305 it is ahistorical to assume this is the goal behind re-
quiring shareholder approval of mergers and sales. Instead, the require-
ment for shareholder approval of mergers and sales stems from legitima-
cy concerns—specifically the need for consent, for its own sake, by owners 
to the alteration of their property rights.306 Seen in this light, heightened 
judicial scrutiny of the merger or sale would no more provide a functional 
substitute for an un-coerced shareholder vote than it would if the current 
directors cancelled the annual election of the board and asked the court to 
review whether the incumbents have done a good job. 
 Still, one might argue that while legitimacy in the alteration of owner-
ship rights was the historical basis for the shareholder vote, the vote 
serves a different function today. The problem is that most of the academ-
ic rationalizations for the shareholder vote focus more on trying to explain 
why decisions to merge or sell are different from decisions that do not re-
quire shareholder approval than they do on explaining why a shareholder 
veto produces smarter decisions. So, for example, Melvin Eisenberg ar-
gues that while directors have an advantage in expertise when it comes to 
business decisions (e.g., build a plant, discontinue a product line), share-
holders have as much expertise as directors when it comes to broad in-
vestment decisions (buying and selling stock their company).307 Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel argue that while shareholders will not 
pay much attention to ordinary corporate decisions, they will give 
thoughtful consideration to critical decisions such as whether to merge.308 
Both of these arguments, even if accurate,309 suggest that shareholders 
                                                                                                                                        
 304. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2010). 
 305. See, e.g., Gevurtz, supra note 40 (explaining that the basic approach to conflict of 
interest transactions is to have someone trustworthy determine whether conflicted directors 
gave the corporation a fair deal). 
 306. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 
N.C. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (1992) (tracing the history of shareholder voting rights from a partner-
ship / contract concept in which the owners (shareholders) had the ultimate control over the 
company and fundamental changes in the owners’ rights required the consent of all, to a 
shared control by managers and owners, with the owners’ majority vote required for certain 
changes in the corporate entity). 
 307. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS  
14-16 (1976). 
 308. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 416 (1983). 
 309. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 10, at 58 (arguing that rational shareholders will not 
spend the effort to find grounds to oppose a merger buried in the proxy statement and will 
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are not going to make worse decisions than the board when it comes to 
selling or merging the corporation; but they do not really say that share-
holders will make better decisions.310 Ronald Gilson gets closer to such an 
argument when he asserts that final period incentives justify the share-
holder vote;311 but we have already addressed the problem with arguing 
that the final period situation uniquely calls for heightened scrutiny of 
mergers and sales. 
 Legitimacy as the basis for the shareholder vote also means that ar-
guments based upon the shareholders being dumb, ignorant, or con-
fused, or having a greedy short-term perspective, do not justify—
notwithstanding the unfortunate holding in this regard in Time312—
impinging upon the shareholders’ power to veto mergers or sales. As the 
later history of the Time-Warner combination suggests,313 sometimes 
the confused shareholders would have gotten it right, while the board 
got it wrong. More fundamentally, the very existence of the shareholder 
franchise resolves such arguments in favor of the shareholders. 
3.   A Horsehead in the Bed 
 As discussed earlier,314 termination fees and asset and stock lock-ups 
can punish shareholders for a negative vote, thereby potentially coercing 
shareholders into voting for a merger or sale they would otherwise reject. 
This prospect depends upon the terms of the fees or lock-ups and upon 
their size. 
 Looking at terms, one must distinguish fees or lock-ups only triggered 
if the corporation is immediately sold at a better price, from fees or lock-
ups triggered by a shareholder rejection in the absence of a better offer 
(naked no-votes). The former should have no direct impact upon the 
                                                                                                                                        
approve a merger even where approval is not what an informed shareholder would do). But 
see Kai Li, Tingting Liu & Juan Wu, Vote Avoidance and Shareholder Voting in Mergers and 
Acquisitions (European Corp. Governance Inst. Fin., Working Paper No. 481, 2016), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2801580 [https://perma.cc/R2RW-BG7R] (study finding correla-
tion between requirement of approval by shareholders of acquiring company and better out-
comes in mergers and acquisitions). 
 310. If the notion is that shareholders will make better decisions (when lack of exper-
tise or rational apathy do not apply) because shareholders have the best incentive to judge 
what is in their own interest, then judicial assessment of a deal’s merits does not provide a 
functional substitute. 
 311. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE 
ACQUISITIONS, 720-21 (2d ed. 1995). 
 312. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153-54 (Del. 1989) (Time’s 
directors successfully argued that the shareholders might be ignorant, mistaken, or confused 
in preferring Paramount’s offer). 
 313. E.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, 
and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 291 n.105 (1990) (describing later price of Time-
Warner stock). 
 314. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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shareholders’ decision—since the fee or lock-up does not happen with a 
simple rejection, and there is no sense voting for an inferior deal over a 
superior one just to avoid the fee or lock-up that becomes the buyer’s prob-
lem.315 Fees or lock-ups falling between those triggered by naked no-votes 
and those limited to an immediate other sale—as, for example, those trig-
gered upon by the mere appearance of another offer prior to a shareholder 
rejection, even if the company never takes the other offer, or where the fee 
or lock-up lingers to reach sales or mergers taking place well into the fu-
ture316—create the need for individual analysis and evidence to determine 
their potential impact on the shareholders’ vote. 
 Turning to size, the fee or lock-up’s financial impact and, hence, the 
degree to which it influences the shareholders’ decision is de minimis 
when the fee or lock-up is small enough. As the fees or lock-ups grow, it 
becomes an empirical question, upon which a court might wish to consid-
er actual evidence,317 as to when their negative impact upon the corpora-
tion and shareholders becomes material in motivating the shareholders to 
vote for a merger or sale that the shareholders might otherwise reject. 
 Brazen raises the question of whether a legitimate reason for a termi-
nation fee or asset or stock lock-up should matter once a fee or lock-up is 
of a nature and size to influence the shareholders’ vote. As discussed ear-
lier,318 a rational interpretation of Brazen’s holding that termination fees 
in a merger contract are part of the merits of the deal and so are not coer-
cive, would limit this to fees having a legitimate purpose independent of 
their impact on how the shareholders vote. What, if anything, is a legiti-
mate purpose, however, calls for a more careful analysis than found in 
Brazen or in much of the literature on the topic. 
 The fact that the buyer demanded the fee or lock-up as the price of en-
tering a favorable merger is not a legitimate purpose, in itself, for a mate-
rial termination fee or asset or stock lock-up. Otherwise, a provision al-
lowing the buyer to dynamite all of the selling company’s properties if the 
selling company’s shareholders vote down the merger would not be coer-
cive if demanded by the buyer as a non-negotiable condition for entering a 
favorable agreement. Instead, we must engage in a two-sided analysis 
                                                                                                                                        
 315. McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505-06 (Del. Ch. 2000). Fees or lock-ups 
will have an indirect impact on the shareholders’ decision if they deter other bids or impact 
the desirability of a competing stock-for-stock bid; but we will address this later. 
 316. In Brazen for example, $200 million was payable if the company received a proposal 
from another party before the shareholders voted to reject the merger regardless of whether 
the company merged with this other party or anyone else; another $350 million became paya-
ble if within a year and half the company accepted an offer from a party who made a proposal 
prior to the vote. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 45 (Del. 1997). 
 317. See, e.g., Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 24, at 703 (discussing the use of expert 
witnesses on the impact of deal protections). 
 318. See supra text accompanying note 208. 
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examining both what legitimate reason a buyer has for demanding a ter-
mination fee or asset or stock lock-up and why this reason makes it legit-
imate for the selling corporation’s board to agree to the fee or lock-up. 
 Brazen points us to a seemingly reasonable concern: The buyer is in-
vesting time and energy in seeking the deal, which will go uncompensated 
if the purchase does not occur. A termination fee or a lock-up option to 
buy assets or stock cheaply provides compensation for these costs in the 
event the shareholders vote down the deal. Hence, as a first approxima-
tion, the buyer is justified in asking for such compensation and the seller’s 
board is justified in agreeing in exchange for getting a bid or getting a bet-
ter bid, all of which are completely independent of trying to force the deal 
through. It turns out, however, that issue is far more complex than sug-
gested by this first approximation. 
 To begin with, it is misleading to suggest, as is often done,319 that the 
board must agree to termination fees or asset or stock lock-ups or else 
prospective buyers will not spend the money to put together a bid. As il-
lustrated by the facts in Revlon and Omnicare, proposed deal protections 
come as part of a package with a bid; indeed, a board would be crazy to 
agree to significant fees or lock-ups without knowing what the bid is. 
Hence, the costs incurred by the prospective buyer in initially investigat-
ing the company and negotiating the bid are sunk before the board agrees 
to deal protections.320 
 Still, there can be further costs after the board accepts the offer, such 
as due diligence and regulatory compliance,321 fees entailed in lining up 
external financing,322 as well as various switching costs triggered by the 
anticipation of integrating the merging firms together,323 which the buyer 
may be less willing to incur (or incur at the same deal price) without as-
surance of recovery in the event of a negative shareholder vote. Potential-
ly larger, Brazen pointed to the opportunity costs incurred by the buyer 
while waiting on the shareholders’ decision; albeit one should probably 
discount the value of the buyer’s lost opportunity to engage in another 
acquisition to reflect the statistics showing buyers often have cause to re-
gret acquisitions. 
 There can also be a case for covering initial investigation and negotia-
tion costs when the selling corporation sought out prospective buyers with 
the assurance, even if not a binding contract, that the company will agree 
to termination fees or asset or stock lock-ups if the board likes their offer. 
                                                                                                                                        
 319. E.g., Griffith, supra note 21, at 613. 
 320. E.g., Richard M. Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Govern-
ance, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1705 (1985). 
 321. E.g., Tarbert, supra note 241, at 632. 
 322. E.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 10, at 87. 
 323. Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 358-60. 
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Indeed, one might argue that the customary practice of boards agreeing to 
fees and lock-ups creates an enticement for prospective buyers to incur 
search and negotiation costs on a more general scale.324 The evidence for 
this phenomenon is inconclusive.325 Moreover, a shrewd board, if thinking 
only of the interest of the shareholders as shareholders in the selling cor-
poration, would decline to protect the buyer’s sunk costs—at least if not 
negotiating with a repeat player that might stand its ground to preserve 
its reputation.326 This, in turn, brings us back to the question of whether 
the law should command boards to focus solely on the interest of the 
shareholders as shareholders of the selling corporation.327 
 Beyond this, we must consider the fact that the buyer’s risk addressed 
by termination fees or asset or stock lock-ups only exists because corpo-
rate law curbs the board’s authority to merge or sell the company without 
shareholder approval; parties do not need such provisions for contracts 
binding upon the corporation the minute the board agrees.328 This raises 
the question of whether the fees or lock-ups should themselves be beyond 
the board’s authority. Put differently, if we assume that corporate law 
encapsulates the arrangements parties would have made for themselves 
if they wrote up a contract, does it make sense to assume that sharehold-
ers would have insisted on retaining a veto over whether to sell or merge 
                                                                                                                                        
 324. E.g., Skeel, supra note 24, at 568. 
 325. Compare Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 24, at 700-01 (effects of lockups on attract-
ing initial offers are uncertain), with John C. Coates, IV, M&A Break Fees: U.S. Litigation 
Versus UK Regulation, in REGULATION VERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS 
AND LAW 255, 262–63 (Daniel Kessler ed., 2011) (There are more bids in the United States, 
where boards commonly agree to termination fees and the like, than in England, where 
boards cannot agree to such terms). The problem is that a prospective buyer faces other risks 
beyond shareholder rejection when deciding whether to embark upon possibly acquiring an-
other corporation—including the investigation showing that the prospective target is unsuit-
able, failure to reach a deal with the targeted corporation’s board, and, worst of all, the acqui-
sition turning out to be a business mistake—which makes it uncertain how much difference it 
will make to remove the risk of wasted costs just in case of shareholder rejection. 
 326. A rational buyer should neither agree to pay more than its reservation price (the 
point at which the purchase is no longer profitable) in exchange for a promise to cover sunk 
costs if the deal does not occur, nor, viewing the negotiation as a one-off, should the buyer 
stop bidding before reaching its reservation price, thereby leaving a profitable deal on the 
table with nothing to show for its sunk costs, simply because the seller refuses to pay the 
sunk costs if the deal does not go through. 
 327. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 291, at 1176-80 (board actions that pre-
vent bidders from recovering investigation costs by raising the price the buyer must pay in 
the one sale, while good for the one company’s shareholders in the one deal, will decrease the 
number of acquisitions, resulting in less wealth creating transactions and less discipline on 
inefficient management, to the detriment of shareholders as a group overall). 
 328. This is not addressing termination fees triggered by events independent of share-
holder disapproval, such as antitrust or regulatory barriers. Some commentators have at-
tempted to defend termination fees as serving the same function as liquidated damages. E.g., 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-ups in Negotiated Corporate 
Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 245-46 (1990). It is not a breach of the contract, however, 
for the shareholders to vote down the merger. 
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the company, but still have authorized their board to promise a consola-
tion prize to the prospective buyer if the shareholders decide that the 
board brought back a poor deal—particularly if the consolation prize is 
large enough to influence the shareholders to accept a deal that they 
would prefer to reject? 
 We can simplify things considerably by focusing our attention on fees 
and lock-ups triggered by rejections other than to take a better offer—
keeping in mind that fees and lock-ups limited to rejections to take a bet-
ter offer do not pressure shareholders in their votes. Once we narrow our 
focus to rejections in the absence of a better offer—which is quite rare329—
the risk that the buyer will be out its deal costs without a deal to show for 
it, and, accordingly, the concern that bidders will not bid without fees and 
lock-ups, decreases dramatically. Moreover, it is one thing to offer, as 
sometimes done for government procurement contracts, to compensate 
bidders’ costs for preparing a bid in order to entice bidders to enter into an 
expensive competitive bidding process in which only one bidder can pre-
vail. It is something quite different to offer to compensate such costs in 
the event that shareholders conclude that their board negotiated a poor 
deal. Indeed, the buyer’s request for such compensation signals that the 
buyer thinks the board negotiated a poor deal for the shareholders; oth-
erwise why else be worried that the shareholders would reject the deal in 
the absence of a better offer from someone else?330 
 Hence, termination fees or asset or stock lock-ups triggered by naked 
no votes should be considered coercive if the fee or lock-up is large enough 
to be material. In other cases (such as Brazen), the court should carefully 
assess both the potential influence of the fee or lock-up on the sharehold-
ers’ vote and the costs incurred or expected before the vote by the buyer—
giving greater weight to out-of-pocket costs necessarily incurred between 
the board action and the shareholder vote—and seek to reach a reasona-
ble balance covering the most justified expenses with the least influence 
on the shareholders. 
                                                                                                                                        
 329. John Mark Zeberkiewicz & Blake Rohrbacher, Paying for the Privilege of Independ-
ence: Termination Fees Triggered by “Naked No Votes,” 21 INSIGHTS 1, 2 (2007) (shareholder 
rejection of the Lear-Icahn merger in 2007 was only the 8th time since 2003 that sharehold-
ers voted down a merger out of the over 1000 submitted for shareholder approval). 
 330. One might argue that such compensation is justified by the option effectively created 
as a result of the logistical delay entailed in obtaining a shareholder vote in a public corpora-
tion, during which time the shareholders can sit back and see whether subsequent events 
make the deal unattractive. See, e.g., Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342, 1982 WL 8774, at *3 (Del. 
Ch. July 6, 1982), rev’d sub nom. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Beyond 
better offers, however, it is difficult to know what such events could consist of; but this might 
be a rationale for upholding an agreement providing for termination fees in the event of 
shareholder rejection upon either a superior offer or other material intervening event (the 
company striking gold). 
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4.   A Choice not an Echo 
 While termination fees and asset and stock lock-ups triggered only 
when shareholders reject a deal to take a better offer do not directly influ-
ence how the shareholders vote, these and other deal protections can indi-
rectly influence shareholder approval by deterring potentially better deals 
surfacing before the vote.331 This raises the question of whether depriving 
shareholders of potential choices interferes with their right to veto mer-
gers and sales. At first glance, the answer is obviously yes. Depriving the 
shareholders of possible better offers effectively pressures them to vote for 
the board-favored deal as the only game in town. 
 On the other hand, this conclusion once again embodies an ahistorical 
view of the purpose for the shareholder vote. Corporate statutes requiring 
shareholder approval of a merger or sale long pre-date the relatively re-
cent phenomenon of prospective buyers taking advantage of the resulting 
logistical delay in order to make competing offers to the shareholders.332 
There is no sign that the goal behind the requirement for shareholder ap-
proval was to establish a mandatory forum in which every public compa-
ny was effectively up for auction after the board had entered one deal. 
Instead, as discussed earlier,333 the shareholder vote requirement stems 
from legitimacy concerns calling for the owner’s consent. The model is 
consent to one deal, not picking off a menu. 
 Admittedly, even if the requirement of shareholder approval was orig-
inally based upon legitimacy, this does not mean that the requirement 
might not serve a different purpose today. Before concluding, however, 
that the requirement for shareholder approval has evolved to serve the 
important function of promoting auctions,334 one must ask why demand 
auctions only for selling the corporation—why not require the board to 
submit all large corporate contracts to competitive bidding before the 
board can enter a binding agreement? Also, why demand a second auction 
in cases in which the board accepted the merger or sale agreement only 
after conducting an auction to begin with? 
 More broadly, this gets into the debate regarding the utility of selling 
the corporation through auctions and of allowing boards to influence the 
process through deal protections granted to one bidder (so-called pre-
                                                                                                                                        
 331. Or by rendering a competing stock-for-stock deal less attractive. 
 332. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 306 (tracing history of shareholder voting rights through 
nineteenth-and early twentieth-century developments); Tarbert, supra note 241, at 631 (deal 
jumping by making a higher bid between the time of the merger agreement and the time of 
shareholder approval sharply increased in the mid-1990s). 
 333. See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
 334. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, Omnicare’s Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. 795, 828-33 
(2013) (arguing that allowing higher bids before shareholder vote will produce prices closer to 
the buyer’s reservation price). 
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commitment). Attempting to run through this debate here would unduly 
lengthen an already long article. Suffice it to say that the bottom line is 
that there is no bottom line. Instead, the literature is full of conflicting 
predictions concerning the impact of allowing board intervention in the 
auction process,335 compounded by an often-unacknowledged difference as 
to what the desired object of the law should be.336 This reminds us why 
judicial review proceeds with humility in pursuing the goal of avoiding 
unintended harm from board decisions and suggests caution before turn-
ing the requirement for shareholder approval into a tool for demanding 
auctions that last until the shareholders vote.337 
 All told, this analysis suggests that board actions, which deter compet-
ing offers, but otherwise leave undiminished the shareholders’ power to 
veto the deal agreed to by the board, do not call for heightened scrutiny 
based upon the goal of protecting the shareholders’ power to vote against 
a board-favored deal. Of course, there can be other reasons for imposing 
heightened scrutiny upon such actions. Specifically, concerns over disloy-
                                                                                                                                        
 335. See, e.g., Ayres, supra note 24 (purporting to show when stock lock-ups will prevent 
a higher valuing bidder from prevailing in a contest to acquire the corporation); Timothy R. 
Burch, Locking out Rival Bidders: The Use of Lockup Options in Corporate Mergers, 60 J. 
FIN. ECON. 103, 106 (2001) (study of acquisitions found that target shareholders are not sys-
tematically harmed by use of lockup options, but on average obtained higher returns in deals 
in which such options were used); Coates IV & Subramanian, supra note 22, at 311-13 (test-
ing the theoretical models put forward by Ayres, Fraidin & Hanson, and Kahan & Klausner 
against the available empirical evidence and finding that their models are inadequate in ex-
plaining the impact of lockups on bidder behavior and more generally on the market for cor-
porate control); Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 24, at 700 (“[L]ock-ups may have positive, 
negative, or no effects depending upon the circumstances of the transaction. Nor can we make 
definitive empirical conclusions at this time about the effect of lock-up-creep. It is difficult to 
isolate and identify individual lock-ups and their effect on bidding.”); Fraidin & Hanson, su-
pra note 24, at 1822-30 (presenting examples purporting to show that lock-ups can allow 
desirable deals to take place and will not produce undesirable deals); Kahan & Klausner, 
supra note 23, at 1545-51 (identifying a critical missing element in Ayres’ analysis of the 
effects of lock-ups); Quinn, supra note 21, at 878-80 (arguing that leaving the threat of a 
higher offer open leads to higher prices for the shareholders); Skeel, supra note 24, at 567-84 
(challenging Fraidin & Hanson’s analysis).  
 336. Specifically, is the goal to obtain the highest price for the selling shareholders, see 
Griffith, supra note 21, to have the party who places the highest value on the corporation win 
the contest to acquire the company regardless of the price paid, see Coates IV & Subramani-
an, supra note 22, or to promote corporate acquisitions as a discipline on inefficient manage-
ment, see Kahan & Klausner, supra note 23. 
 337. Since state legislatures never had auctions between competing buyers in mind when 
creating the requirement for shareholder approval of mergers, it is not only fortuitous that 
auctions now occur as the result of the logistical delay in obtaining shareholder approval, but 
it is also an accident that the sequence written into the statute—board approval first, share-
holder approval later—does not lend itself to arrangements commonly found in contexts in 
which owners have agents sell their property pursuant to prior instruction, whether that 
involves masterpieces auctioned at Sotheby’s or decorator art sold through a consignment 
store. Perhaps legislatures should amend corporation statutes to allow the shareholders to 
switch the order by authorizing the board to sell pursuant to an auction or negotiation follow-
ing specified rules with perhaps a minimum price. But this is a topic for another article. 
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alty can justify heightened scrutiny of board actions to protect a deal in 
which the directors will retain their positions or otherwise have a conflict. 
This conclusion also makes it is important to distinguish between deal 
protections that present the shareholders with an immediate choice be-
tween saying yes or no to just one offer and deal protections that deter 
other bids sufficiently far into the future so as to effectively lower the val-
ue of the shareholders’ stock and thereby punish negative votes. The test 
is to ask whether the long-term negative impact of the deal protection’s 
deterrence of offers appearing after the shareholders vote would be mate-
rial to shareholders in deciding how to vote even in absence of any other 
present bidders. 
5.   Voting in the Dark 
 Some deal protections or other board actions reduce information avail-
able to the shareholders prior to voting on a merger or sale, thereby un-
dermining the effectiveness of the shareholders’ veto power. Lest, howev-
er, shareholders start demanding retreats at nice resorts in order to hear 
presentations about the proposed merger, not every board decision that 
arguably reduces, in some manner, information to shareholders consti-
tutes a breach of fiduciary duty. Once again, the question should be what 
is reasonable. 
 The easiest part is to say that shareholders should receive whatever 
material information the board knows. Hence, withholding material in-
formation or misleading the shareholders, and any agreement that would 
call for such, is a breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, viewing the matter in 
terms of the goal of policing the allocation of power with respect to a vote 
undertaken as an exercise in legitimacy establishes that scrutiny of dis-
closure to the shareholders is worthwhile without regard to establishing 
that better deals result.338 The issues of whether there can be a more cost-
effective way of ensuring complete and accurate disclosure than class ac-
tion litigation and when courts should approve disclosure only settle-
ments are subjects beyond the scope of this article. 
 The more difficult problem arises with deal protections—such as no-
talk provisions and standstill agreements with don’t ask, don’t waive 
terms—which indirectly cut off information to the shareholders by cutting 
off information to the board. Here, the issue becomes whether it is suffi-
cient that the shareholders know what the board knows—so long as the 
board had adequate information to make its decision under the relevant 
standard—or does the fact that the board serves as a conduit for infor-
mation to the shareholders change the standard under which the court 
                                                                                                                                        
 338. But see Fisch et al., supra note 12. 
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evaluates the board’s obligations with respect to obtaining information. 
The answer should depend upon symmetry in the use of the information. 
 In a situation in which the directors needed to gather positive and 
negative information about a proposed deal (including prospects for better 
offers) for their own decision as much as do the shareholders, then the 
standard should not change because of the indirect impact on information 
going to the shareholders. Symmetry breaks down if the directors favor a 
deal in which they retain their positions or otherwise have an interest. In 
this instance, however, increased scrutiny based upon loyalty concerns 
can protect against actions by the board to remain blissfully ignorant of 
possible better deals. Symmetry breaks down more subtly for information 
arising after the board agrees to a deal, even when directors do not retain 
their positions or have any other interest. Unless the board is engaged in 
an active post-signing market check, and particularly if the board has 
agreed to a force the vote provision, at this point we are talking about in-
formation whose primary utility is for the shareholders to vote against the 
deal the board made. This raises a power issue and the normal human 
instinct not to be as concerned about keeping information flowing so that 
someone else can say you were wrong. 
 Hence, reasonableness scrutiny of actions potentially curbing infor-
mation reaching the board and, in turn, the shareholders in the interval 
between the board’s and the shareholders’ approval is appropriate. This 
does not mean that any interference is unreasonable. For example, as 
pointed out earlier,339 standstills with don’t ask, don’t waive provisions 
might serve the legitimate function of forcing prospective buyers to pre-
sent their best offer during an auction, which can be especially useful if 
the board feels it can obtain the highest price by conducting a sealed bid, 
rather than an English style auction.340 
6.   Executive Action 
 Time illustrates how directors can eliminate the shareholders’ power 
to veto a board-favored deal by structuring the transaction to avoid the 
requirement for a shareholder vote. It is difficult to see how courts can 
subject deal protections to heightened scrutiny in order to protect the 
shareholders’ power to veto a board-favored merger or sale, but, at the 
same time, give a pass under the business judgment rule to structuring 
the deal in a manner that avoids putting the merger or sale to a vote alto-
                                                                                                                                        
 339. See supra text accompanying note 192. 
 340. Jay B. Kesten, Adjudicating Corporate Auctions, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2015) (ex-
plaining how the sealed bid auction can produce bids closer to the winning bidder’s reserva-
tion price than is the case with the traditional English open bidding auction—in which the 
winning bid is just higher than the second place bidder’s reservation price—and how the 
sealed bid auction cannot occur without the board being able to commit to the winning bidder 
prior to the shareholder vote). 
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gether. Indeed, if Time stands for the proposition that Unocal governs 
only when the action avoiding the vote occurs after the appearance of a 
hostile bid, then the result simply might be to encourage boards to struc-
ture mergers or sales from the outset in a manner that avoids the vote. 
 There are a variety of factors beyond shareholder voting rights—e.g., 
insulation from liabilities, acquisition of non-transferable property, tax 
treatment, general business concerns—that might influence parties to 
structure a merger or sale as a triangular transaction and to pay with 
cash rather than stock.341 If these factors result in a deal structure in 
which shareholders do not get to vote, so be it. Reasonableness inquiry 
should establish the bona fides of these reasons in motivating the board’s 
decision, but courts should otherwise respect the board’s decision. Given 
the somewhat arbitrary lines dividing deal structures requiring a share-
holder vote from those that do not, so long as the board is taking a “let the 
chips fall where they may” attitude toward the impact of their chosen deal 
structure on the requirement of a shareholder vote, so should the court. 
 The more difficult question is what can justify a board decision, as in 
Time, to deliberately avoid a shareholder vote. The rationale accepted in 
Time that Time’s shareholders might have preferred Paramount’s offer 
because they were ignorant, mistaken, or confused seems to fly in the face 
of requiring a shareholder vote in any instance. Indeed, perhaps the only 
legitimate reason for allowing the board to structure a transaction with 
the goal of avoiding the requirement for a shareholder vote would be 
where the board is entirely confident in prevailing but seeks to avoid the 
delay and expense entailed in going through the exercise. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 There is considerable room for improvement in judicial review of board 
decisions saying yes. Courts should cut back on when they treat decisions 
to sell or merge differently from other board decisions and, whenever they 
treat such decisions differently, should more carefully match the standard 
with the goals for judicial review. 
 Cutting back on treating board decisions to sell or merge the corpora-
tion differently from other board decisions involves differences in what 
courts say and what they do. In terms of the latter, courts should be on 
the lookout for the unconscious tendency to apply more rigorous review to 
board decisions to sell or merge even when purporting to apply conven-
tional standards of review. 
 In terms of explicitly distinct standards for reviewing board decisions 
to sell or merge, Delaware courts can start by abolishing the Revlon doc-
trine. The Revlon decision, itself, can be viewed as an application of the 
                                                                                                                                        
 341. E.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 110, at 869-85, 950-77, 988-1030. 
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business judgment rule to an extreme situation in which, because the 
shareholders cashed out, it became impossible to rationalize how looking 
out for creditors was in the long-range interest of the shareholders as 
shareholders of the corporation.342 
 Courts should apply a reasonableness (Unocal without the bells 
and whistles) review based upon either of two triggers: (1) the direc-
tors maintain their positions following the sale or merger; or (2) the 
shareholders’ veto power is diminished. Conventional approaches ad-
dressing conflicts for officers and individual directors are sufficient to 
handle the potential disloyalty resulting from continued employment 
or side deals for senior executives. 
 The rigor with which the court should review board actions favoring a 
buyer who will retain the directors should depend (when based upon pro-
tecting against disloyalty) upon the degree to which the directors’ posi-
tions were threatened without the challenged action and the degree to 
which the sale or merger reduced the current directors’ power and securi-
ty in any event. Hence, deal protections adopted when, even without the 
protections, there is no present or likely future other bidder who would 
replace the board should get the same slack in reviewing reasonableness 
given to the mere adoption of a poison pill prior to the appearance of any 
hostile offer. Sales that transfer control from widely dispersed sharehold-
ers to a single person also require somewhat less (rather than greater as 
current law stands) rigorous scrutiny for reasonableness even when direc-
tors retain their positions following the sale. 
 Actions calling for reasonableness scrutiny because they undermine 
the effectiveness of the shareholders’ power to veto mergers and sales in-
clude termination fees and asset and stock lock-ups of a nature and mag-
nitude to be material to the shareholders’ vote because of their negative 
effect on the value of the shareholders’ stock, actions that reduce infor-
mation to shareholders, and structuring transactions in a manner that 
avoids a shareholder vote. They do not, contrary to Omnicare, include 
shareholder voting agreements and force the vote provisions. Critically, 
they also do not include actions that deter other potential offers without 
otherwise impacting how the shareholders vote. 
 Reasonableness scrutiny triggered by loyalty concerns is ultimately 
about whether the directors favored a deal that would preserve their posi-
                                                                                                                                        
 342. Of course, this does not mean directors must (or even may) advance shareholder 
interests by violating statutes, judicial doctrines, or contracts existing for the protection of 
creditors or other corporate stakeholders. This includes, for example, fraudulent transfer acts, 
provisions for the protection of creditors found in corporation statutes, fiduciary duties im-
posed by courts in favor of creditors when the corporation is insolvent, employment laws, laws 
protecting tort victims, antitrust laws, and so on. Also, states choosing to follow a more liberal 
view of directors’ duties in respect to balancing the interests of shareholders versus other 
stakeholders will not follow the Revlon decision even as limited to its extreme facts. 
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tions over a better deal for the shareholders. By contrast, assessing the 
reasonableness of actions challenged for their impact on the shareholders’ 
veto power is not about the merits of the deal. Courts should view some 
actions impacting the shareholders’ veto as per se unreasonable. This in-
cludes: material termination fees and asset and stock lock-ups either trig-
gered by naked no votes or exceeding a reasonable estimate of the buyer’s 
costs, failure to fully disclose material facts to the shareholders, and (con-
trary to Time) structuring transactions in a way that avoids a shareholder 
vote because the board fears the shareholders will vote down the deal. 
Other actions will require a more nuanced evaluation of the extent to 
which the action reduces in some manner the effectiveness of the share-
holders’ veto power versus legitimate reasons for the action. 
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